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CULTURAL CONVERGENCE: INTEREST 
CONVERGENCE THEORY MEETS THE 
CULTURAL DEFENSE 
Cynthia Lee* 
Defendants who successfully introduce cultural evidence in their defense have one 
thing in commonthe cultural norms underlying their claims are either similar to 
or complement American cultural norms, including retrograde racist and sexist 
norms. This Article argues that cultural convergence is one way to understand 
these results. Cultural convergence is the idea that the cultural defense claims of 
minority and immigrant defendants are more likely to receive accommodation 
when there is convergence between their cultural norms and American cultural 
norms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the so-called “cultural defense”—the 
proffering of cultural evidence by a criminal defendant seeking to mitigate a 
charge or sentence.1 Many scholars support the admission of this kind of evidence, 
but urge its limitation to negate the mens rea.2 Others take the position that the 
                                                                                                                
    1. The term is somewhat misleading as there is no official “cultural defense” 
per se. The term is used to refer to a criminal defendant’s use of cultural evidence to support 
a traditional criminal defense, to mitigate a charge or sentence, or to support a plea bargain.  
    2. See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent, and Cultural Dissonance: 
The Unequal Treatment of Cultural Defense Defendants, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 
201 (2006) [hereinafter Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent, and Cultural Dissonance]; Nancy S. 
Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A Framework for 
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admission of cultural evidence violates the principle of equal protection by 
favoring immigrant and minority defendants over non-immigrant, non-minority 
defendants, and therefore should be sharply circumscribed.3 Recently, a few legal 
scholars have issued calls for recognition of an official cultural defense.4  
In this Article, I neither defend nor criticize the practice of using culture 
in the criminal courtroom.5 Rather, I seek to illuminate why some uses of it seem 
more successful than others. Generally speaking, immigrants and minority 
defendants who seek to proffer cultural evidence in their defense do not succeed. 
Either the judge deems such evidence irrelevant and denies its admission, or the 
jury is unpersuaded that the defendant’s cultural background should be grounds for 
leniency. An extensive review of the literature6 suggests that immigrant and 
                                                                                                                
Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 115 (1997) [hereinafter Kim, The Cultural Defense and the 
Problem of Cultural Preemption]; Kay L. Levine, Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and 
Culture: A Sociolegal Perspective on Cultural Defense Strategies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
39, 39 (2003). 
    3. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through 
Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (1996); Valerie 
L. Sacks, An Indefensible Defense: On the Misuse of Culture in Criminal Law, 13 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 523, 524–25 (1996); Julia P. Sams, Note, The Availability of the 
“Cultural Defense” as an Excuse for Criminal Behavior, 16 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 335, 
351–52 (1986). But cf. Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the 
Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1612–13 (1996) (responding to 
Coleman). 
    4. See, e.g., ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004) 
(arguing for the establishment of an official cultural defense which would act as a partial 
excuse); Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317 
(2006) (arguing for recognition of culture as a justification, rather than an excuse). 
    5. I am generally in favor of giving criminal defendants wide latitude to present 
relevant evidence in their defense, including cultural evidence. Because the presentation of 
such evidence carries the risk of reinforcing negative stereotypes about a given racial or 
ethnic group, I suggest that prosecutors be prepared to counter negative stereotypes with 
expert witnesses of their own. I am thus in agreement with Holly Maguigan, who argues the 
following: 
[T]he goal of committing the criminal justice system to the effective 
prosecution of family violence offenses should be accomplished, not by 
limiting the rights of defendants to present cultural information to juries 
and judges, but by imposing on prosecutors the obligation to educate 
those juries and judges so that dispositions do not reflect acceptance of a 
stereotypical view of the cultural legitimacy of male dominance. 
Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist 
Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 43 (1995). 
    6. RENTELN, supra note 4; Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The 
“Honor” of the “East” and the “Passion” of the “West,” 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287 (1997); 
Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty 
Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1994) [hereinafter Chiu, The Cultural Defense]; Chiu, 
supra note 4; Elaine M. Chiu, Culture in Our Midst, 17 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 231 
(2006) [hereinafter Chiu, Culture in Our Midst]; Carolyn Choi, Application of a Cultural 
Defense in Criminal Proceedings, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 80 (1990); Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman, Culture, Cloaked in Mens Rea, 100 S. ATL. Q. 981 (2001) [hereinafter Coleman, 
Culture, Cloaked in Mens Rea]; Coleman, supra note 3; Rashmi Goel, Can I Call Kimura 
914 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 49:911 
 
minority defendants who successfully introduce cultural evidence in their defense 
have one thing in common: the cultural norms underlying their defense are either 
similar to or coalesce with those of the dominant majority. Borrowing from 
Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory,7 I argue that cultural convergence is 
one way to explain these results. Cultural convergence is the idea that the interests 
of minority and immigrant criminal defendants in obtaining leniency seem most 
likely to receive accommodation when there is convergence between dominant 
majority cultural norms and the cultural norms relied upon by the immigrant or 
minority defendant. 
                                                                                                                
Crazy? Ethical Tensions in the Cultural Defense, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 443 (2004); 
Kristen L. Holmquist, Cultural Defense or False Stereotype? What Happens When Latina 
Defendants Collide With the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 
45 (1997); Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent, and Cultural Dissonance, supra note 2; Kim, The 
Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption, supra note 2; Anh T. Lam, 
Culture as a Defense: Preventing Judicial Bias Against Asians and Pacific Islanders, 1 
ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLANDS L.J. 49 (1993); Levine, supra note 2; Choua Ly, The Conflict 
Between Law and Culture: The Case of the Hmong in America, 2 WIS. L. REV. 471 (2001); 
Maguigan, supra note 5; Alison Matsumoto, A Place for Consideration of Culture in the 
American Criminal Justice System: Japanese Law and the Kimura Case, 4 J. INT’L L. & 
PRAC. 507 (1995); Deirdre Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation 
and Distortion of Culture: A Hmong “Marriage By Capture” Case in Fresno, California, 4 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1995); Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural 
Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 437 (1993) [hereinafter 
Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse]; Alison Dundes Renteln, 
Raising Cultural Defenses, in CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE (2001); Nilda 
Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in the 
Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1991); Sacks, 
supra note 3; Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Cultural Defense: One Person’s Culture is Another’s 
Crime, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 751 (1987); James J. Sing, Culture as Sameness: 
Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 
1845 (1999); Melissa Spatz, A “Lesser” Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for 
Men Who Kill Their Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 597 (1991); Deborah Boulette 
Taylor, Paying Attention to the Little Man Behind the Curtain: Destroying the Myth of the 
Liberal’s Dilemma, 50 ME. L. REV. 445 (1998); Catherine Trevison, Changing Sexual 
Assault Law and the Hmong, 27 IND. L. REV. 393 (1993); Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for 
Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89 (Winter 2000) [hereinafter Volpp, Blaming 
Culture for Bad Behavior]; Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the 
“Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1994) [hereinafter Volpp, 
(Mis)Identifying Culture]; Volpp, supra note 3; Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine A. 
Connors, Kargar and the Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829 
(1999); Deborah Woo, The People v. Fumiko Kimura: But Which People?, 17 INT’L J. 
SOCIOL. L. 403 (1989); Alice J. Gallin, Note, The Cultural Defense: Undermining the 
Policies Against Domestic Violence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 723 (1994); Nicole A. King, 
Comment, The Role Of Culture In Psychology: A Look at Mental Illness and the “Cultural 
Defense,” 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 199, 223–24 (1999); Note, The Cultural Defense in 
the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986); Sams, supra note 3; Spencer Sherman, 
When Cultures Collide, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1986, at 33. 
    7. Interest convergence, according to NYU law professor Derrick Bell, is the 
idea that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only 
when it converges with the interests of whites.” Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).  
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This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I present an overview of the 
major legal issues surrounding the use of cultural evidence in the criminal 
courtroom. Part II provides a comprehensive taxonomy of the ways Bell’s interest 
convergence theory has found application in scholarship on a variety of subjects 
from reparations to pension reform. In Part III, I illustrate how cultural 
convergence can help explain the successful use of culture in the criminal courts. 
Three types of cases in which cultural defense arguments seem to be the most 
successful support my thesis: (1) Asian immigrant men who kill their unfaithful 
Asian immigrant wives and claim that they acted reasonably within the dictates of 
their culture; (2) Asian immigrant women who kill their children and claim they 
were attempting to commit parent–child suicide upon learning of their husband’s 
infidelity; and (3) Hmong men charged with rape who claim they were engaging in 
the Hmong custom of marriage by capture. Cultural convergence is also evident in 
the rare case in which a Black man successfully asserts a deviance defense like 
“Black Rage” or “mob contagion.” 
I. THE “CULTURAL DEFENSE” 
Although the term “cultural defense” is frequently used in academic 
circles and by the bench and bar, no official body has recognized such a defense. 
Rather, the term “cultural defense” refers to the introduction of cultural evidence 
by immigrant and/or racial minority defendants seeking to refute or mitigate 
criminal charges. Defendants may offer cultural evidence to show that they lacked 
the mental state required for commission of the charged offense8 or to bolster a 
traditional criminal law defense, such as self-defense,9 insanity10 or provocation.11 
                                                                                                                
    8. In State v. Haque, 726 A.2d 205, 207 (Me. 1999), for example, the defendant 
unsuccessfully attempted to proffer evidence that his traditional Muslim Indian upbringing 
strongly influenced his perception of his relationship with the victim and how he reacted 
when she terminated the relationship, thus showing that he lacked the requisite mens rea for 
murder. 
    9. In State v. Wanrow, 538 P.2d 849, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975), defense 
attorneys representing an Indian woman charged with second-degree murder unsuccessfully 
attempted to introduce expert testimony relating to the defendant’s Indian culture to 
demonstrate that “an Indian, confronted by an older person attempting to perform an 
unnatural sex act on a young child, would undergo a more traumatic emotional experience 
than a member of the Anglo-Saxon culture because of the highly respected position an older 
person possesses in the Indian culture.” In Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 195 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1995), a Vietnamese male defendant argued that when he fatally shot the victim (another 
Vietnamese man) in the back, he was acting in self-defense because Vietnamese culture 
teaches that police are corrupt and people have to take the law into their own hands. See 
also Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, supra note 6, at 
454–56 (discussing the Patrick “Hooty” Croy case, where defense attorney Tony Serra 
successfully argued that given his Native American background, Croy acted reasonably in 
self-defense when he fatally shot a white police officer). 
  10. In People v. Metallides, Case No. 73-5270 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1974), the defense 
attorney successfully used a temporary insanity argument based on the defendant’s Greek 
culture, arguing that under the law of the old country, one does not wait for the police if 
one’s daughter has been raped. See also Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as 
Partial Excuse, supra note 6, at 464. 
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They may also offer cultural evidence in support of a plea bargain12 or lenient 
sentence.13 
The term “culture” has been defined in many ways.14 A standard 
definition of culture is that it consists of “[a] set of rules or standards shared by 
members of a society which, when acted upon by the members, produce behavior 
that falls within a range of variance the members consider proper and 
acceptable.”15 This standard definition fails to recognize that “culture is 
experienced differently by different people within a particular community, for 
example, along lines of age, gender, class, race, or sexual orientation.”16 Moreover, 
as Leti Volpp has often pointed out, “[c]ulture is not some monolithic, fixed, and 
static essence.”17 It varies over time and depends on context. 
No official rule specifically governs the admissibility of cultural evidence 
in the criminal courtroom. Sometimes judges admit cultural evidence; sometimes 
they exclude it. This lack of consistency and predictability is unsettling to 
defendants and makes it difficult for defense attorneys to advise their clients or 
develop appropriate strategies. As Alison Dundes Renteln and Deirdre Evans-
                                                                                                                
  11. For example, in Trujillo-Garcia v. Rowland, No. 93-15096, 1993 WL 
460961, at *1–2 (9th Cir. 1993), the defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury to 
apply a reasonable Mexican person standard to his claim of provocation. 
  12. In People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (L.A. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985), the 
prosecutor allowed the defendant, a Japanese woman who killed her two young children and 
then attempted to commit suicide, to plead guilty to manslaughter. See also Kim, The 
Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption, supra note 2, at 121. In United 
States v. Whaley, 37 F. 145, 145–46 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1888), the district attorney decided to 
dismiss the murder charge and permit the defendant to plead guilty to manslaughter in light 
of Indian customs and superstitions. See also Maguigan, supra note 5, at 63–67 (discussing 
the use of cultural background information in plea bargaining and sentencing proceedings). 
  13. See United States v. Carbonell, 737 F. Supp. 186, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(where sentencing court departed downward from the applicable federal sentencing 
guidelines in part because defendant’s “sole motivation in agreeing to [commit the crime] 
was to help out a fellow Colombian from the same hometown who was down on his luck,” 
after hearing that an obligation to help others from one’s country is a “common sentiment in 
the Hispanic community”); State v. Rodriguez, 204 A.2d 37, 38 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1964) 
(reducing sentence based in part on defendant’s Puerto Rican heritage); see also Damian W. 
Sikora, Note, Differing Cultures, Differing Culpabilities?: A Sensible Alternative: Using 
Cultural Circumstances as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1695, 1698 
(2001) (arguing for cultural evidence to be used as a mitigating factor at sentencing). But 
see Gutierrez v. State, 920 P.2d 987, 990–91 (Nev. 1996) (affirming death sentence despite 
evidence regarding defendant’s upbringing in Mexico and the local cultural belief in 
witches). 
  14. A.L. KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 41–72 (1952) (collecting over 150 different definitions of 
“culture”).  
  15. Michaël Fischer, Note, The Human Rights Implications of a “Cultural 
Defense,” 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 663, 669 (1998) (quoting WILLIAM A. HAVILAND, 
ANTHROPOLOGY 278 (5th ed. 1989)). 
  16. Volpp, supra note 3, at 1592.  
  17. Id. at 1589.  
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Pritchard have remarked, “whether a defendant can invoke a cultural defense 
depends almost entirely on the luck of the draw, that is, on who the judge is.”18 
Whether immigrant and minority defendants should be allowed to 
introduce cultural evidence in their defense is a hotly contested issue, with 
multiculturalists and feminists often taking opposite positions.19 Defenders of 
cultural evidence argue that the United States is a multicultural and pluralistic 
society which should permit immigrants and minorities to show how their cultural 
backgrounds may have contributed to their actions.20 Some feminist scholars have 
opposed the admission of cultural evidence on the ground that it can further harm 
the victim of cultural violence who is often a woman or a child.21 Because cultural 
evidence often finds use by male defendants who have killed or harmed female 
victims, the admission of cultural evidence appears to condone such violence.22 
                                                                                                                
  18. Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 6, at 36. 
  19. Chiu, The Cultural Defense, supra note 6, at 1120–25 (describing the debate 
between feminists and multiculturalists over the admissibility of cultural evidence); 
Maguigan, supra note 5, at 97; see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD 
FOR WOMEN? 9–24 (1999) [hereinafter OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?] 
(arguing that there is a considerable likelihood of tension between feminism and 
multiculturalism, especially when cultural groups seek to use culture as a defense in 
criminal cases); Susan Moller Okin, Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions, 108 
ETHICS 661, 664 (1998) (arguing that liberal progressives often fail to take into account 
tensions between feminism and multiculturalism).  
  20. See, e.g., Sing, supra note 6, at 1847 (noting that advocates of cultural 
evidence “claim that recognition of a cultural defense will advance two desirable ends 
consistent with the broader goals of liberal society and the criminal law: (1) the 
achievement of individualized justice for the defendant; and (2) a commitment to cultural 
pluralism”); Sikora, supra note 13, at 1707–08 (arguing that “forced assimilation goes 
against the American ideal that cultural pluralism should be encouraged and that America is 
a place where people from all over the world can come, and their differences will be 
accepted and embraced”).  
  21. Coleman, supra note 3, at 1095; Rimonte, supra note 6; Gallin, supra note 6; 
Naomi Mendelsohn, Note, At the Crossroads: The Case for and Against a Cultural Defense 
to Female Genital Mutilation, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1033 (2004) (arguing that 
enabling a cultural defense to female genital mutilation sends a message that culture is more 
valuable than the bodily integrity of women and children); Michele Wen Chen Wu, 
Comment, Culture Is No Defense for Infanticide, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
975, 977 (2003) (“[A] child’s right to live . . . makes one’s culture an inadequate defense.”). 
But see Janet C. Hoeffel, Deconstructing the Cultural Evidence Debate, 17 U. FLA. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 303, 320–21 (2006) (noting that a review of fifty cultural evidence cases 
showed that twenty-two of the cases did not involve violence against women or children, 
and, of the eighteen that did, the use of cultural evidence to excuse or justify a male 
defendant’s violence against a woman was effective in drastically reducing the charge or 
sentence in only three cases). 
  22. Coleman, supra note 3, at 1095 (“What happens to the victims—almost 
always minority women and children—when multiculturalism and individualized justice are 
advanced by dispositive cultural evidence?”). Coleman notes that the question of whether 
cultural evidence should be admitted puts liberals in a quandary, which she calls the 
“Liberals’ Dilemma.” Id. at 1096. Coleman argues that liberals, who tend to respect both 
cultural difference and the rights of women, have to choose one over the other when 
deciding whether cultural evidence should be admitted. But see Taylor, supra note 6, at 447, 
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Opponents of cultural evidence also argue that admitting it violates the 
principle of equal protection by favoring immigrants and racial minorities over 
other Americans.23 Doriane Coleman, for example, argues: 
Tolerance of the use of immigrant cultural evidence in criminal 
proceedings fundamentally conflicts with the principle that ‘the 
protections given by the laws of the United States shall be equal in 
respect to life and liberty . . . [for] all persons.’ Indeed, permitting 
cultural evidence to be dispositive in criminal cases violates both the 
fundamental principle that society has a right to government 
protection against crime, and the equal protection doctrine that holds 
that whatever protections are provided by government must be 
provided to all equally, without regard to race, gender, or national 
origin.24 
This argument that recognition of cultural evidence gives immigrants and 
racial minorities special treatment over Americans overlooks the fact that 
Americans already have an advantage in the American criminal courtroom. As Leti 
Volpp has observed, talking about a “cultural” defense for immigrants erroneously 
presumes that America is without a culture.25 Numerous criminal law doctrines, 
including the “no duty to retreat” rule in self-defense law, the broad version of the 
defense of habitation, and the “reasonable belief in consent” defense against 
forcible rape, reflect the American culture in which we live.26 Moreover, when an 
American asserts a defense that includes a reasonableness requirement, such as 
self-defense, provocation, duress or necessity, he or she can rely on American 
cultural norms to bolster his or her claims of reasonableness.27 
Recently, a few scholars have renewed calls for recognition of a separate 
cultural defense. In her recent book, The Cultural Defense,28 Alison Dundes 
Renteln argues that courts should take culture into account when adjudicating 
criminal cases. Renteln proposes an official cultural defense, enabling defendants 
to introduce evidence concerning their culture and its relevance to their case.29 She 
                                                                                                                
465–70 (arguing that the “‘liberal’s dilemma’ arises from an overly narrow definition of 
culture that is Eurocentric, racist, and sexist”); Volpp, supra note 3, at 1575 (challenging 
Coleman’s thesis as “a regressive vision of immigrant communities, of multiculturalism, 
and of scholarship on these issues”). 
  23. See Coleman, supra note 3. 
  24. Id. at 1135–36. 
  25. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 62 (“Creating a ‘cultural 
defense’ for immigrants in the United States thus rests on the implication that U.S. law is 
without a culture.”).  
  26. See Chiu, Culture In Our Midst, supra note 6; see also Volpp, Blaming 
Culture for Bad Behavior, supra note 6, at 115; Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 
6, at 62, 68; Volpp, supra note 3. 
  27. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR 
IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003) (arguing that traditional criminal law defenses that 
include a reasonableness requirement, such as the defense of provocation and the defense of 
self-defense, are in essence cultural defenses that favor American defendants); Sing, supra 
note 6, at 1869 (calling the defense of provocation a “dominant cultural defense”).  
  28. RENTELN, supra note 4. 
  29. Id. at 187. 
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reasons that “[a] defendant whose criminal act is culturally motivated is less 
blameworthy” than one whose acts are not culturally motivated, and therefore 
deserves less punishment.30 Renteln’s proposed cultural defense would operate as 
a partial excuse.31 That is, a defendant’s culture would not exonerate the defendant 
completely, but could mitigate the charged offense. 
Similarly, Elaine Chiu argues that the criminal law should recognize 
culture as a defense. In contrast to Renteln, Chiu argues that culture should operate 
as a complete justification, not merely as a partial excuse.32 Chiu reasons when 
cultural claims are treated as partial excuses, the criminal law suggests that the 
defendant is mentally or emotionally deficient.33 Often, however, nothing is wrong 
with the defendant. He or she has simply acted in conformity with his or her 
culture.  
It is unlikely that state legislators will enact legislation recognizing an 
official cultural defense anytime soon. After the September 11, 2001 terror attacks 
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there was little public sympathy for 
people with different cultural or religious backgrounds who commit crimes of 
violence purportedly because of these backgrounds. In light of rising anti-
immigrant sentiment today,34 publicly elected officials might worry about the 
political consequences of supporting legislation that would make it easier for 
defendants who commit culturally motivated crimes to win acquittals or lighter 
sentences. 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which cultural defenses are 
successful.35 No nationwide database tracks the outcomes in cultural defense cases. 
                                                                                                                
  30. Id. at 189. 
  31. Id. at 191. 
  32. Chiu, supra note 4. 
  33. Id. 
  34. For example, under mounting pressure from constituents opposed to illegal 
immigration, in October 2006 Congress passed legislation authorizing the construction of 
700 miles of fencing along the U.S. and Mexican border. Michael A. Fletcher & Jonathan 
Weisman, Bush Signs Bill Authorizing 700-Mile Fence for Border, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 
2006, at A4. Also in 2006, anti-immigration forces launched a “Send-A-Brick” campaign, 
encouraging citizens to send bricks to members of Congress, asking them to stop the flood 
of illegal immigration. Carl Hulse, A Build-a-Protest Approach to Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 31, 2006, at A15. In 2007, President George W. Bush’s attempts to enact immigration 
reform legislation met with fierce opposition from his Republican base because of 
provisions that would allow illegal immigrants to become lawful permanent residents if they 
fulfilled certain requirements. See Michael Abramowitz, Immigrant Legislation Splits GOP; 
Right Lashes Out at Bush and Senate Over Compromise, WASH. POST, May 19, 2007, at A1. 
In April 2007, Republican Representative Dan Lungren joined fellow Republican 
Representatives Nathan Deal (GA) and Brian Bilbray (CA) in introducing legislation that 
would end birthright citizenship. David Whitney, Citizenship Bill Faces Long Odds in 
Democratic Congress, THE PROVIDENCE SUNDAY J., Sept. 16, 2007, at A16 (noting that 
“each year, an estimated 400,000 babies are born in the United States to mothers who are 
illegal immigrants” and currently “each of these babies automatically becomes a U.S. 
citizen when it takes its first breath”). 
  35. Nontheless, Susan Moller Okin notes that the three types of cases in which 
cultural defenses have been used most successfully in the United States are: (1) cases in 
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Moreover, in this country, most traditional legal research relies on the published 
appellate decision. Whenever any defense strategy is successful, the defendant 
rarely files an appeal. Without an appeal, the chances of a published written record 
about the case are extremely low. This makes research about the effectiveness of 
particular defense strategies extremely difficult.36  
Nonetheless, commentators seem to agree that most attempts to use 
cultural evidence to exonerate a defendant or mitigate charges fail.37 One reason 
may be a “when in Rome, do as the Romans do” way of thinking about the law.38 
Judges and jurors often feel immigrants and racial minorities who live in America 
should abide by American laws and customs. If they break the law, they should not 
hide behind a curtain of cultural tradition different from America’s dominant 
culture.  
This “when in Rome” argument enjoys great appeal, drawing, as it does, 
on our strong tradition of not allowing people to argue ignorance of the law. If I 
fail to file my income taxes, I cannot escape liability by claiming I did not know I 
had to do so. Ignorance of the law is no excuse.  
The problem with this argument is that it does not seem to apply to most 
cultural defense cases. While some immigrant defendants may seek to use cultural 
evidence to excuse their ignorance of the law, most do not. Rather, most seem to 
introduce evidence about their cultural background to rebut an element of the 
charged offense, such as the mens rea, or to bolster a traditional criminal law 
defense, such as insanity, provocation, or self-defense.39 Given that immigrant and 
minority defendants seek to use cultural evidence to bolster traditional criminal 
law defenses, it is odd that most such attempts are unsuccessful. This makes the 
relatively rare successful uses of cultural evidence all the more interesting.  
Another reason cultural claims often fail may be a result of what Dan 
Kahan and Donald Braman call “cultural cognition.”40 According to Braman and 
Kahan, jurors and judges, like ordinary people, evaluate the credibility of people, 
arguments, and evidence through the prism of their own cultural norms.41 If these 
                                                                                                                
which Hmong men kidnap and rape Hmong women, then claim their actions were part of 
their cultural practice of marriage by capture; (2) cases in which male immigrants from 
Asian and Middle Eastern countries murder wives who “have committed adultery or treated 
their husbands in a servile way”; and (3) cases in which Japanese or Chinese mothers killed 
their children and attempted to kill themselves in response to spousal infidelity. OKIN, IS 
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 19, at 18. As discussed in Part III, 
cultural norm convergence is reflected in all three of these categories. 
  36. Another problem is that research in this area must rely heavily on newspaper 
and media coverage which is sporadic and tends to focus on the exceptional cases. 
  37. See, e.g., RENTELN, supra note 4, at 5; Maguigan, supra note 5; Sacks, supra 
note 3, at 523. Janet Hoeffel describes a number of cases in which defense attempts to use 
cultural evidence were not successful. See Hoeffel, supra note 21, at 321–27. 
  38. RENTELN, supra note 4, at 5, 193. 
  39. See supra notes 8–11; see also Taylor, supra note 6, at 448. 
  40. See Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Legal Realism as Psychological and 
Cultural (Not Political) Realism, in HOW LAW KNOWS 93, 94 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence 
Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2007). 
  41. Id. at 102. 
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norms are widely shared, as they often will be when the defendant, the attorneys, 
the witnesses, the judge, and the jurors are all white and American, jurors will tend 
to agree with one another on whether a witness is credible, whether an argument 
makes sense, and whether particular evidence is relevant. In contrast, “in cases 
where there is competition between cultural groups over which values should be 
privileged in the law, there will be serious disagreement.”42 Often this 
disagreement will manifest itself in differences in interpretations of the law and 
even the facts.43 Jurors and judges may downplay the relevance of evidence that 
fails to conform to preexisting scripts.44 Thus, when an immigrant or minority 
defendant claims that his culture encouraged him to act in a way that violated 
American law, American judges and jurors may not understand the relevance of 
the defendant’s cultural evidence because it fails to conform to their cultural 
norms. When the immigrant or minority defendant’s claim conforms to American 
cultural norms, the claim may be more readily accepted. 
A variety of factors contribute to the effectiveness of any particular 
criminal defense strategy, including the makeup of the jury, the background of the 
judge, the cultural sensitivities of the attorneys, and the attitude of the victim (or 
victim’s family) toward the defendant.45 In “cultural defense” cases, another factor 
comes into play. Whether there is convergence between the cultural norms relied 
upon by the immigrant or minority defendant and the cultural norms of American 
society may also influence the ultimate verdict. Cultural convergence theory finds 
roots in Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory, to which I will now turn.  
II. INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY 
The term “interest convergence” was first coined by Derrick Bell in a 
Harvard Law Review article published in 1980.46 In that article, Bell responded to 
criticisms leveled by Herbert Wechsler against the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education.47 In his famous 1959 article, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law,48 Wechsler accused the Court of deciding Brown 
without a neutral and principled basis. In response, Bell pointed out that at least on 
a normative level, racial equality was “the neutral principle which underlay the 
Brown opinion.”49 However, because racial equality was not viewed by most 
Americans in the 1950s as a desirable goal, Bell posited that the real driving force 
behind Brown was interest convergence. Interest convergence, explained Bell, is 
the idea that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”50  
                                                                                                                
  42. Id. at 114. 
  43. Id. at 102. 
  44. Id.  
  45. I thank Sara Sun Beale for this observation about the importance of the 
attitude of the victim or victim’s family toward the defendant. 
  46. Bell, supra note 7.  
  47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
  48. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).  
  49. Bell, supra note 7, at 522. 
  50. Id. at 523. 
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Bell explained how the Brown decision to end racial segregation in the 
public schools reflected a convergence between the interests of blacks in achieving 
racial equality and the interests of whites. Brown helped the United States in its 
Cold War foreign relations by providing the U.S. with instant credibility regarding 
its well-advertised commitment to racial equality. Segregation had hurt America’s 
reputation as a nation committed to freedom, equality, and democracy for all, and 
had undermined America’s efforts to persuade Third World countries to convert to 
democracy. By ordering the public schools to desegregate, the Court demonstrated 
America’s commitment to equality to the world.51 
Bell also posited that the Brown decision helped America in its efforts to 
persuade African Americans that they were a welcome part of the United States. 
Bell pointed out that Blacks who had fought for this country in World War II were 
returning home to widespread racial discrimination. Elite whites worried that in the 
event of another war, African Americans might be reluctant to fight again. The 
Brown decision was thus important domestically as a symbol of America’s 
commitment to equality.52  
In later work, Bell elaborated upon his theory, explaining:  
[Only] when whites perceive that it will be profitable or at least 
cost-free to serve, hire, admit, or otherwise deal with blacks on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, they do so. When they fear—accurately or 
not—that there may be a loss, inconvenience, or upset to themselves 
or other whites, discriminatory conduct usually follows.53 
According to Bell, “racism is a permanent feature of American society, 
necessary for its stability and for the well-being of the majority of its citizens.”54 
Interest convergence explains how Blacks “are able to achieve political gains 
despite the essentially racist nature of American society.”55 Commenting on Bell’s 
theory, Charles Ogletree notes that interest convergence works as a safety valve, 
permitting “short-term gains for African Americans when doing so furthers the 
short- or long-term goals of the white elite. . . . This is an important check on 
widespread disaffection that may end in revolution.”56 
Although Bell’s hypothesis about the underlying motivations behind the 
Brown decision initially evoked much skepticism and even outrage,57 ultimately 
his hypothesis was vindicated. In 2000, Mary Dudziak, a professor of law and 
                                                                                                                
  51. Id. at 524. 
  52. Id. at 524–25. 
  53. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM 7 (1992). 
  54. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The Survivor’s Story, 24 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 20 (2004) (citing BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra 
note 53, at 3–10). 
  55. Id. 
  56. Id. at 21. 
  57. Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American 
Fortunes—Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 369, 
373 (2002) (reviewing MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE 
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000)). 
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history at the University of Southern California, published Cold War Civil Rights: 
Race and the Image of American Democracy.58 In her book, Dudziak provided 
proof in the form of U.S. State Department files, other archival records, and 
international media coverage that “Brown v. Board of Education and the softening 
of racial attitudes that it ushered in were largely prompted by Cold War 
considerations.”59 Dudziak explains that even though Brown was decided in 1954 
when Dwight D. Eisenhower was President, it was the Truman administration’s 
Department of Justice “that initiated the government’s participation in the legal 
battle to overcome Jim Crow.”60 The Truman administration submitted amicus 
curiae briefs in numerous civil rights cases preceding Brown, emphasizing “the 
international implications of race discrimination . . . [and] the negative impact on 
U.S. foreign relations that a prosegregation decision might have.”61 In one brief, 
the Truman administration “hammered home the point that racial segregation 
hampered the U.S. government’s fight against world communism.”62 The Brief of 
the United States as amicus curiae in Brown reflects the foreign-policy concerns 
behind the administration’s involvement in civil rights cases: 
[T]he existence of discrimination against minority groups in the 
United States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other 
countries. Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist 
propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even among friendly nations 
as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.63 
Several legal scholars were quick to recognize that Dudziak’s work 
essentially confirmed the theory that Bell had put forth twenty years earlier.64 In a 
review of Dudziak’s book, Robert Chang and Peter Kwan note that “Mary 
Dudziak’s work provides a wonderful complement to Derrick Bell’s.”65 Richard 
Delgado notes that Dudziak’s book and an article she published in the Stanford 
Law Review “build on an impressive insight by Derrick Bell that gains for blacks 
coincide with white self-interest and materialize at times when elite groups need a 
breakthrough for African Americans, usually for the sake of world appearances or 
the imperatives of international competition.”66 Similarly, Neil Gotanda writes: 
Mary Dudziak has written a study of the foreign policy influences 
upon Brown. Dudziak used as her framework of analysis, an 
influential suggestion of Professor Derrick Bell that civil rights 
                                                                                                                
  58. DUDZIAK, supra note 57. 
  59. Delgado, supra note 57, at 373. 
  60. DUDZIAK, supra note 57, at 90.  
  61. Id.  
  62. Id. at 93. 
  63. Id. at 100. 
  64. Dudziak cites to Bell at least once in her book, id. at 258 n.26, and in an 
earlier piece she more explicitly acknowledged the link between her work and Bell’s 
interest convergence theory. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 61, 66 (1988) (noting that her article “demonstrates Derrick Bell’s interest-
convergence thesis”). 
  65. See Robert S. Chang & Peter Kwan, When Interests Diverge, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 1532, 1537 (2002) (reviewing DUDZIAK, supra note 57). 
  66. Delgado, supra note 57, at 371.  
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progress occurs when there is an interest convergence between 
white Americans and Black Americans, and that progress ends when 
their interests diverge. She concludes that the Bell interest 
convergence hypothesis is supported by the history of Brown.67 
Other legal scholars have endorsed Bell’s theory more explicitly, 
applying it in a number of different ways.68 First, legal scholars have used interest 
convergence theory to explain Supreme Court cases, legislative enactments, and 
state court decisions.69 Second, legal scholars have used interest convergence 
theory as an affirmative tool of strategy or prediction regarding mostly legislative 
                                                                                                                
  67. Neil Gotanda, Towards Repeal of Asian Exclusion: The Magnuson Act of 
1943, the Act of July 2, 1946, The Presidential Proclamation of July 4, 1946, The Act of 
August 9, 1946, and The Act of August 1, 1950, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309, 313 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1996). 
  68. A few legal scholars have focused on Bell’s theory of racial sacrifice which 
cautions minority groups against being too quick to join with majority causes because when 
minority and majority interests diverge, minority interests are likely to be sacrificed to 
preserve the majority’s position: 
The flip side to Bell’s interest-convergence theory is his theory of racial 
sacrifice. Just as the interests of blacks are advanced when they converge 
with the interests of whites, he argues that the interests of blacks and 
even hard-won racial remedies will be sacrificed or abrogated when such 
remedies threaten the interests of “superior societal status of whites.” 
Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology Through 
Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 272 (2005) (citing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., 
SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPE FOR 
RACIAL REFORM 69 (2004)). Scholars who focus on Bell’s theory of racial sacrifice include 
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion 
of “A Just Balance” Changes So Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851, 865 (1994) (“[I]nterest 
convergence is not a particularly promising avenue for blacks and others interested in 
promoting the cause of hate-speech regulation.”); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Ninth 
Chronicle: Race, Legal Instrumentalism, and the Rule of Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 379 
(1994) (warning minorities to cautiously seek interest convergence because any gains may 
be short-lived while the losses will be long lasting); Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, 
The Politics of Workplace Reforms: Recent Works on Parental Leave and a Father-
Daughter Dialogue, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1031 (1988) (warning that some of the recent 
workplace reforms, such as parental leave, may not be beneficial to women in the long run); 
Maurice R. Dyson, Playing Games With Equality: A Game Theoretic Critique of 
Educational Sanctions, Remedies, and Strategic Noncompliance, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 577, 
604–09 (2004) (explaining the interest convergence dilemma which “arises when minority 
and majority coalitions find a common basis to cooperate but where cooperation ultimately 
leads to a marginal, if not harmful, result for minorities”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For 
Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (2005) 
(reviewing BELL, supra). Bell’s racial sacrifice theory is viewed by some as a strand of 
Bell’s interest convergence theory. I treat Bell’s theory of racial sacrifice as a separate 
theory.  
  69. See infra Part II.A; see also Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race 
Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 715 (2005) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s refusal to extend disparate impact theory to equal protection jurisprudence in 
Washington v. Davis was consistent with Bell’s interest convergence theory). 
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reform.70 To a certain extent, interest convergence in the legislative context is not 
surprising given that politicians are accustomed to horse-trading to achieve their 
goals. What is interesting is that interest convergence, while normal and expected 
in the legislative context, appears to be operating vigorously in the judicial context, 
where some might say it should have no force.  
A. Interest Convergence as Explanation    
Interest convergence theory is often deployed to explain a particular case 
or a line of judicial decisions or legislative enactments. Just as Derrick Bell used 
the theory to explain the latent forces behind the Brown decision, other legal 
scholars have used interest convergence to explain a host of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, legislative enactments, and lower state court cases. 
1.  Supreme Court Cases 
a.   Hernandez v. Texas 
Richard Delgado uses interest convergence theory to explain the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hernandez v. Texas.71 Hernandez was indicted for the 
murder of a man named Joe Espinosa by a grand jury in Jackson County, Texas.72 
He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.73 Prior to trial, Hernandez’s 
lawyer moved to quash the indictment, arguing that persons of Mexican descent 
had suffered systematic exclusion from service as jury commissioners, grand 
jurors, and petit jurors, and that this exclusion deprived his client of equal 
protection.74 The trial judge denied the motion.75 
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed on the ground that 
Mexican people are white people of Spanish descent.76 Since the grand jury that 
indicted Hernandez and the petit jury that tried him were “composed of members 
of his race, it cannot be said, in the absence of proof of actual discrimination, that 
[Hernandez] has been discriminated against . . . and thereby denied equal 
protection of the laws.”77 
                                                                                                                
  70. See infra Part II.B. Because Bell’s theory has enjoyed widespread 
application, this review of the legal scholarship applying interest convergence summarizes 
only a small, but representative, sample of such scholarship. Some scholars have used 
interest convergence neither to explain judicial or legislative action nor to advocate for 
social or political reform. See, e.g., Michael Dehaven Newsom, Some Kind of Religious 
Freedom: National Prohibition and the Volstead Act’s Exemption for the Religious Use of 
Wine, 70 BROOKLYN L. REV. 739 (2005) (positing that interest convergence is responsible 
for the benefits to minority religious groups of the Volsted Act’s exemption for the religious 
use of wine); Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92 (2004).  
  71. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
  72. Id. at 476. 
  73. Id. 
  74. Id. at 476–77. 
  75. Id. at 477. 
  76. Hernandez v. State, 251 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Tex. App. 1952). 
  77. Id. at 536. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the systematic exclusion 
of persons of Mexican descent from service as jurors in Jackson County deprived 
Hernandez of the equal protection of the laws.78 Noting a history of pervasive 
discrimination against Mexicans in southern Texas, evidenced by whites-only 
bathrooms and a sign in at least one local restaurant barring Mexicans,79 the Court 
ruled that: 
Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a 
certain class will serve on a particular jury or during some particular 
period. But it taxes our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in 
there being no members of this class among the over six thousand 
jurors called in the past 25 years. The result bespeaks 
discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision on the 
part of any individual jury commissioner. The judgment of 
conviction must be reversed.80 
While Hernandez has been hailed as a major civil rights victory for 
Mexican Americans, Delgado notes that fear of Latin American communism and 
domestic unrest may have prompted the Supreme Court decision more than a 
concern for the rights of Mexican-Americans.81 At the time Hernandez was 
making its way up to the Supreme Court, the United States “was in the early stages 
of the Cold War, in which it was competing with the Soviet Union for the loyalties 
of the Third World.”82 The U.S. Communist Party was starting to agitate for the 
rights of Mexican farm and mine workers,83 and several government commissions 
had examined the threat of Latin American communism.84 In 1950, Assistant 
Secretary of State Edward Miller warned of the dangers of communist political 
aggression in Latin America.85 Three years later, then Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles predicted: 
[T]he conditions in Latin America are somewhat comparable to . . . 
China in the mid-thirties when the Communist movement was 
getting started . . . if we don’t look out, we will wake up some 
morning and read in the newspapers that there happened in South 
America the same kind of thing that happened in China in 1949.86 
Apparently, several of the Justices on the Supreme Court were aware of 
these Cold War concerns. Justice William Douglas, for example, wrote about how 
racial discrimination in America hurt America’s standing abroad.87 On one trip to 
Panama, he wrote to a friend in the United States about how that country was ripe 
                                                                                                                
  78. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 477–82.  
  79. Id. at 479–80. 
  80. Id. at 482. 
  81. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundtable, Hernandez v. Texas and the 
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 41 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 23, 43 (2006).  
  82. Id. at 40. 
  83. Id. at 43. 
  84. Id. at 45. 
  85. Id. at 49–50. 
  86. Id. at 50. 
  87. Id. at 52 (citing DUDZIAK, supra note 57, at 104). 
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for communism.88 On a second trip to Latin America, Justice Douglas tried to 
dissuade some university students from joining the local communist party. Justice 
Hugo Black worried that America’s treatment of its racial minorities might deprive 
the U.S. of political capital in the fight against world communism.89 Justice Earl 
Warren spoke about how the world looked to the United States as a model of 
justice and expressed his belief that adhering to the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights would make us more secure than a stockpile of hydrogen bombs.90 In short, 
the convergence of interests—the American foreign policy interest in curbing the 
spread of communism in Latin America and the threat of communism at home 
coupled with the interest of Mexican Americans in not suffering systematic 
exclusion from jury pools—may have been an influential factor contributing to the 
result in Hernandez.  
b.   Plyler v. Doe 
Similarly, Maria Pabon Lopez uses interest convergence to explain Plyler 
v. Doe.91 In Plyler, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Texas statute withholding 
funds from local school districts for the education of undocumented children and 
authorizing such districts to deny enrollment to such children violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first explained that 
undocumented children are “persons” entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.92 The Court then considered the possible state interests that might 
support the Texas legislature’s decision to deny the children of undocumented 
immigrants a public education and found none of these interests substantial enough 
to justify the denial.93 The Court seemed particularly concerned that denying a 
public education to the children of undocumented immigrants would impose “a 
lifetime of hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their 
disabling status.”94 
While Plyler v. Doe appears on the surface to be an all-out victory for the 
children of undocumented immigrants and immigrant rights advocates, Lopez sees 
Plyler in a less positive light, arguing that “Plyler acts as a form of preserving the 
undocumented as a separate class, ensuring a primary and secondary education for 
their children but nothing more in society.”95 Lopez explains: 
That Plyler can be viewed as an interest convergence case is further 
evinced by the fact that it was decided at a time when the hiring of 
undocumented workers had not yet been outlawed by the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and thus, it still was 
                                                                                                                
  88. Id. (citing Letter from William O. Douglas to John Cooper Wiley, Apr. 24, 
1953, in THE DOUGLAS LETTERS 294 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987)). 
  89. Id. at 52–53 (citing DUDZIAK, supra note 57, at 106–07). 
  90. Id. at 53–54 (citing DUDZIAK, supra note 57, at 106). 
  91. 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also Maria Pabon Lopez, Reflections on Educating 
Latino and Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1373, 1405 (2005). 
  92. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210–15. 
  93. Id. at 228–30. 
  94. Id. at 223. 
  95. Lopez, supra note 91, at 1398. 
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considered to serve the nation’s interest to have undocumented 
workers and their families in the country.96 
Lopez points out that higher education remains mostly inaccessible for 
undocumented students, largely because they lack legal immigration status.97 
Therefore, while Plyler guarantees the children of undocumented immigrants the 
right to an elementary and high school education, most are unable to go on to 
college and work legally in the United States. The only way they are able to stay in 
this country is by providing inexpensive, under-the-table labor.  
Lopez notes that despite numerous legislative efforts, both at the state and 
federal levels, to overrule or bypass the decision, Plyler remains good law.98 She 
concludes that “[b]ecause the nation’s interest in maintaining a cheap and 
expendable labor force has converged with the expectation of an education for 
undocumented children, Plyler survives to this day.”99 
c.   Grutter v. Bollinger 
Derrick Bell uses interest convergence theory to explain Grutter v. 
Bollinger,100 a 2003 Supreme Court decision upholding the University of Michigan 
Law School’s use of race in its admission program against an equal protection 
challenge by a white applicant.101 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the 
Court, found that Michigan Law School “has a compelling governmental interest 
in attaining a diverse student body.”102 Accepting the position urged by the Fortune 
500 corporations and military officials who filed amici briefs in the case, 
O’Connor wrote that diversity “better prepares [white] students for an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.”103 Bell 
notes that the interests of Fortune 500 companies and the military in having 
prospective employees and prospective military recruits exposed to minorities as 
classmates during law school converged with the interests of minority students 
seeking admission to elite law schools.104 
                                                                                                                
  96. Id. at 1405. 
  97. Id. at 1400. 
  98. Id. at 1395–96. 
  99. Id. at 1405.  
100. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
101. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 
(2003) [hereinafter Bell, Diversity’s Distractions]; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended 
Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1053 (2005); see also 
Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the 
New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 678 (2004) (weakly 
suggesting that Grutter may be “just another example of what Derrick Bell has called 
‘interest convergence’—that civil rights progress occurs only in moments when it benefits 
white elites, whether for economic profit or national security”). 
102. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
103. Id. at 330. 
104. Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, supra note 101, at 1623. But see Victor C. 
Romero, Racial Profiling: “Driving While Mexican” and Affirmative Action, 6 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 195 (2000) (using interest convergence to explain why whites generally do not 
support affirmative action—because it burdens whites). 
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Michael Crusto comes to a similar conclusion. According to Crusto, the 
real reason behind the Supreme Court’s Grutter decision was that a diverse student 
body “enhance[s] the learning environment of the affluent white majority.”105 
According to Crusto, Grutter “treats aspiring African-American students applying 
to America’s elite public universities and professional schools as a ‘diversity 
commodity’: there merely to serve the white majority’s needs.”106 In short, 
Michigan Law School’s admissions policy was upheld because the interests of 
black and other minority students in attending elite universities converged with the 
interests of whites in a diverse learning environment. 
Not everyone sees Grutter as an example of interest convergence. Arthur 
Wolfson takes issue with the view that Grutter reflects a convergence between the 
interests of big business and those of racial minorities.107 Even though the amicus 
briefs filed by leading American businesses in support of the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admissions policy suggest a convergence, Wolfson points 
out that in the same year the Supreme Court decided Grutter, social scientists 
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan exposed “a marked pattern of race-
based discrimination in the hiring process[es] of a cross-section of American 
business.”108 
Bertrand and Mullainathan compared employer responses to resumes 
submitted by fictional job applicants with “very white sounding names” with the 
responses to resumes submitted by fictional job applicants with “very African 
American sounding names.”109 After dividing resumes into two groups (higher 
quality applicants vs. lower quality applicants), Bertrand and Mullainathan sent a 
set of four resumes to employers in response to help-wanted ads in Boston and 
Chicago. Each employer received a resume from a higher quality applicant with a 
white sounding name, one from a lower quality applicant with a white sounding 
name, one from a higher quality applicant with an African American sounding 
name, and one from a lower quality applicant with an African American sounding 
name. They found that resumes with white sounding names had a 10.08% chance 
of producing a callback whereas resumes with African American sounding names 
had a 6.7% chance.110 In other words, “a job applicant with a white sounding name 
can expect one callback for every ten resumes submitted while a similar applicant 
with an African American sounding name can expect one callback for every fifteen 
resumes submitted.”111 
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Wolfson acknowledges that at first glance the amicus briefs submitted in 
support of Michigan’s affirmative action policy by leading American businesses in 
Grutter and the results of the Bertrand and Mullainathan study appear to be 
“wildly contradictory.”112 By supporting affirmative action, big business seemed to 
be expressing “recognition of the value of increasing minority employment.”113 
Yet the Bertrand and Mullainathan study suggests that businesses do not in fact 
value diversity, a fact reflected in their actual hiring practices.  
Wolfson explains that the support of big business for Michigan’s 
affirmative action policy was based primarily on the benefit to potential white 
employees of exposure to nonwhite minorities while attending law school rather 
than an altruistic desire to help minority students get into law school.114 As the 
Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses stated, “‘[i]t is essential 
that [students] be educated in an environment in which they are exposed to diverse 
people, ideas, perspectives and interactions.’”115 Similarly, the brief submitted by 
General Motors placed heavy emphasis on the need for “cross-cultural 
competence” which is gained by potential employees through exposure to students 
of diverse racial groups.116 Wolfson concludes, “[b]ecause the support of big 
business for the Michigan programs reflects less of a concern for hiring minorities 
than for hiring [white] employees who were exposed to minorities as students, that 
support and the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan are not contradictory.”117 
According to Wolfson, the interests of minority students and the interests of big 
business did not converge;118 rather, they diverged. 
Wolfson’s analysis is based on a narrow interpretation of the meaning of 
interest convergence. To Wolfson, interests converge only if the parties have the 
exact same goals and purposes in mind. This, however, is not how Bell understood 
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it. For Bell, black schoolchildren won the right to attend desegregated schools not 
because those in power wanted to integrate the schools, but because desegregating 
the public schools helped American foreign policy interests. In Wolfson’s 
understanding of interest convergence, however, Brown would not be a case of 
interest convergence because those in power were not motivated by a desire to 
help black parents and their children. Interest convergence, however, does not 
require the parties to have the same exact interests. Different, perhaps overlapping, 
interests that produce the same result are sufficient. 
2.  Legislative Enactments and State Court Trends 
Some scholars have used interest convergence not merely to explain a 
Supreme Court opinion, but to give reasons for legislative enactments or trends in 
state courts. For example, John Hayakawa Torok uses interest convergence to 
explain changes to immigration laws affecting Asians.119 Torok examines 
Congress’s decision to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts and laws prohibiting 
Chinese and other Asians from becoming naturalized U.S. citizens beginning in 
1943.120 During this time, the United States was at war with Germany and Japan, 
while China was an American ally.121 Torok notes that “Japanese wartime 
propaganda in China emphasized the racism in American law as shown by the 
Chinese exclusion acts.”122 Japan suggested the United States was no different 
from European colonial powers and that it “intended to colonize China for its own 
imperial purposes.”123 
Then President Franklin Roosevelt recognized that repeal of the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts would help preserve America’s good relationship with China. In a 
message to Congress supporting repeal, Roosevelt stated: 
 There is now pending before the Congress legislation to 
permit the immigration of Chinese people into this country and to 
allow Chinese residents here to become American citizens. I regard 
this legislation as important in the cause of winning the war and 
establishing a secure peace. 
 China is our ally. For many long years she stood alone in 
the fight against aggression. Today we fight at her side. . . . 
 But China’s resistance does not depend alone on guns and 
planes and on attacks on land, on the sea, and from the air. It is 
based as much on the spirit of her people and the faith of her allies. 
We owe it to the Chinese to strengthen that faith. One step in this 
                                                                                                                
119. John Hayakawa Torok, “Interest Convergence” and the Liberalization of 
Discriminatory Immigration and Naturalization Laws Affecting Asians, 1943–1965, 9 
CHINESE AM.: HIST. & PERSP. 1 (1995); see also Gotanda, supra note 67, at 309–16 
(explaining how American foreign policy interests influenced the repeal of the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts). 
120. Torok, supra note 119, at 8. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
932 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 49:911 
 
direction is to wipe from the statute books [the immigration and 
naturalization preclusions]. . . . 
 By the repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws, we can 
correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese 
propaganda . . . .124 
Additionally, Kevin Washburn uses interest convergence theory to 
explain why state courts sometimes recognize tribal criminal convictions while 
refusing to recognize tribal civil judgments.125 In A Different Kind of Symmetry, 
Washburn examines cross-border enforcement of civil and criminal tribal court 
judgments in state courts.126 Washburn begins by observing that a number of state 
courts have begun to respect tribal judgments of conviction (i.e. tribal judgments in 
criminal cases) while refusing to recognize them in civil cases. He notes that since 
tribal courts possess criminal jurisdiction only over Native American Indians, 
recognition of tribal criminal convictions “will always place Indians in greater 
jeopardy than they would face absent such a rule.”127 In contrast, because tribal 
courts sometimes possess civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, “denial of 
recognition of a tribal civil judgment will sometimes have the effect of denying an 
Indian the ability to satisfy a judgment against a non-Indian in state court.”128 
Washburn points out that “no state has yet adopted a fully symmetrical 
approach to tribal civil and criminal judgments,”129 leading to asymmetry in those 
states that recognize tribal criminal judgments but refuse to recognize or have 
presumptions against the recognition of tribal civil judgments. Washburn explains 
this asymmetry in interest convergence terms: 
Viewing tribal courts as the relevant minority group under [interest 
convergence] theory, the notion is that certain states are willing to 
credit tribal court convictions because it serves the public safety 
interests of the non-Indian majority. In contrast, the recognition of 
tribal civil judgments serves no such interest and, thus, under 
Professor Bell’s theory, the non-Indian majority is less willing to 
respect such judgments.130 
In another setting, Michael Crusto uses interest convergence theory to 
explain why antebellum law in the South allowed black mistresses of white men to 
own property.131 Crusto notes that while black women were deemed inferior to all 
others in most respects, the law granted property rights to free black mistresses of 
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white men because this advanced “the sexual desires and needs of the white men 
they served.”132 
B. Interest Convergence as a Tool of Strategy or Prediction 
A number of scholars have used interest convergence theory to advocate 
in favor of desired reform.133 Legal scholarship using interest convergence as a 
strategy or as a means of predicting the success of that strategy can be divided into 
four categories: (1) workplace reform, (2) educational reform, (3) political reform, 
and (4) other reforms. 
1.  Workplace Reform 
Interest convergence theory has been used to promote racial justice or 
equality in the workplace. Legal scholar Michael Green argues that because the 
current political climate provides little hope for improvement under Title VII, the 
best way for employees of color to protect against racial discrimination in the 
workplace is to use alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) methods while 
appealing to the employer’s interest in the diversity rationale expressed in 
Grutter.134 Assuming employers have an interest in fostering diversity in the 
workplace, they should understand the importance of having workplace dispute 
resolution systems in place that are fair to employees of color. Green concludes 
that “the only realistic mechanism for change must focus on the convergence of 
any racial justice interests with the diversity interests of corporate America.”135 
Joseph Feldman uses interest convergence to argue for racial reform in 
the workplace through Title VII litigation brought by white employees against 
employers engaged in racial discrimination in hiring and firing.136 Feldman 
recognizes that white employees will bring such suits only if there are personal 
benefits to doing so, and suggests there are associational benefits from a diverse 
work environment including increased social and economic opportunities.137 He 
concludes that “[i]f the rights of minorities are more likely to be furthered when 
white and minority interests converge, then it is worthwhile to frame convincing 
arguments that those groups’ interests do in fact converge.”138 
Dorothy Brown uses interest convergence theory to encourage workers to 
increase their participation in pension plans and maximize the investment of those 
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funds.139 Brown notes that because the majority of private sector employees do not 
participate in their employer-sponsored pension plans, white workers and workers 
of color have a mutual interest in increasing their participation in pension plans 
and in effectuating pension reform.140 Brown explains that “because employer 
sponsored pension plans exclude a majority of Whites and people of color, 
according to Professor Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis, this may be a 
unique opportunity to effectuate pension reform.”141 
Steven Ramirez uses a similar approach to push for greater diversity on 
corporate boards.142 Ramirez notes that “the bastions of corporate governance 
remain the nearly exclusive province of white males, with no realistic end in 
sight.”143 Ramirez maintains that this racial hegemony survives not because of 
intentional racial discrimination, but because board members are chosen based on 
“cultural proximity to CEOs.”144 Since “upper class white males are frequently 
most culturally proximate to upper class white males,”145 this state of affairs will 
end only when those in power “see it in their interest to end it.”146 Ramirez argues 
that the best way to achieve greater diversity on corporate boards of directors is to 
find political and economic interests that can benefit from diversity and improved 
corporate governance.147 He explains: 
All of this suggests an intriguing interest convergence. With all the 
power that CEOs hold in our managerial corporate state, they are 
not monarchs that may hold themselves above the law—yet. Very 
broad constituencies have large economic stakes in the performance 
of the macroeconomy. To the extent that the full costs of our 
continued apartheid hangover are fully comprehended, these 
constituents are a source of potential political and economic power 
in favor of reform. Corporate capitalists, while clearly on the wane 
in terms of power over the past several decades, are nevertheless 
powerful and fundamentally in favor of reducing the power of 
CEOs. Politicians intuitively fear anti big-business and populist 
cries for reining in the power of business elites. Combined with 
advocates for racial reform, whether Latino, African-American, 
Native-American, white, or Asian-American, these forces would be 
a formidable political and economic power. Add to this mix the 
interest of feminists in board diversity, and a convincing 
convergence of interests in favor of reform emerges.148 
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2.  Educational Reform 
Derrick Bell notes that Grutter is an example of interest convergence as a 
strategy for affirmative action in higher education.149 The interests of minority 
students in attending elite universities converged with the interests of the military 
and big business in having their recruits and employees exposed to a diverse 
student body, and this convergence helped convince the Supreme Court to uphold 
the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program.150 
Interest convergence theory can also be used to reform public 
education.151 In Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences, Mechele 
Dickerson argues that if policymakers can convince middle-class parents who are 
fleeing urban school systems that it is in their interest to improve their schools, 
then both middle class parents and inner city school children will benefit.152 She 
proposes a public school choice and auction system to encourage middle-class 
parents to live in integrated neighborhoods.153 Under her proposal, parents could 
rank their choices of public schools.154 If they did not get into their first choice, 
they could buy a slot from a parent whose child did get into that school.155 This 
would merge the interests of middle-income parents in giving their children a good 
education with those of minority children in going to good public schools.156 
Bryan Adamson uses interest convergence to advocate for school finance 
reform in Ohio.157 Adamson argues any school finance reform that benefits 
African Americans without comparable benefits for wealthy suburban whites will 
be rejected or resisted.158 He explains how school integration efforts in the 1960s 
and 1970s led to white flight into the suburbs.159 “Ohio’s largest cities, with one 
exception, have suffered net population losses, are poorer, and are now 
significantly or predominantly African-American.”160 Adamson notes that African 
Americans and whites have a “markedly different view of the role of courts on the 
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subject of school finance reform.”161 He concludes that in order to be successful, 
school finance reform solutions “must represent some form of interest 
convergence.”162 
3.  Political Reform 
Another area where legal scholars have used interest convergence as a 
tool of strategy or prediction is in pushing for progressive political reform. Sheryll 
Cashin, for example, argues that progressives need to focus on multi-racial 
coalition building to achieve political reform.163 Cashin notes that “[t]he most 
significant debate in the political science literature about multiracial coalitions is 
whether interest or ideology is the more effective motivating force behind 
coalitions.”164 Cashin explains that “ideology” means the “pre-existing opinions 
and attitudes of a particular racial group toward another group.”165 “Interest,” 
according to Cashin, is “the recognized tactical or strategic advantages that one 
racial group can gain by forming a coalition with another group.”166 Cashin notes 
that powerful conservative whites have used racial ideology to co-opt poor and 
working class whites whose interests, she argues, should be aligned with poor and 
working class minorities. Poor and working class whites align themselves with 
other whites because this makes them feel racially superior to non-whites. Cashin 
argues that rather than focusing on ideology, progressives should focus on 
similarity or convergence of interests.167 
Cashin points to one example of a multiracial, multi-class coalition that 
rose up in support of the Texas “10 percent plan,” which guarantees admission to 
the public universities of that state to the top ten percent of every graduating high 
school class in Texas.168 Developed by a group of Latino and Black activists, 
legislators, and academics, this legislation passed only because conservative 
Republican rural legislators whose constituents were not being admitted to the 
University of Texas decided to support it.169 
Another example of interest convergence as a tool of strategy for political 
reform is reflected in the legal scholarship on reparations for African-American 
descendants of slaves. Kevin Hopkins argues that in order for a reparations bill to 
become law, it would need to provide a significant benefit to White America.170 
Similarly, Charles Ogletree notes that reparations litigation has the power to create 
interest convergence between blacks and whites if, for example, “legislation for 
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reparations could be generalized to erase societal disadvantages suffered by whites 
as well as blacks.”171 
Eric Yamamoto and his co-authors go one step further, explaining how 
granting reparations to African Americans can help America secure the moral high 
ground in the ongoing war on terror.172 They argue that “the United States may 
lack the unfettered moral authority and international standing to sustain a 
preemptive worldwide war on terror unless it fully and fairly redresses the 
continuing harms of its own long-term government-sponsored terrorizing of a 
significant segment of its populace.”173 Yamamoto notes that “President Bush 
implicitly acknowledged this ‘interest-convergence’ in his pre-9/11 anniversary 
news conference statement that ‘in order for us to reject what was done to America 
on September 11th, we must reject bigotry in all forms.’”174 Just as the United 
States of the early 1950s “needed to portray democracy as the morally superior, 
‘most civilized’ form of government,”175 the country today needs to promote its 
image as a benevolent democracy abroad.176 It cannot do so if its treatment of 
African Americans is not just.  
In another example of interest convergence as a tool of strategy, Richard 
Delgado suggests ways that interest convergence theory can support progressive 
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immigration reform and racial justice reform.177 With the number of baby boomers 
now retiring, there will be an increasing need for caretakers for the elderly. 
Delgado notes that immigrants are more likely to empty bed pans and do work that 
is considered dirty, but this source of labor will not be available if Congress passes 
restrictive immigration legislation.178 Additionally, in trying to convince Islamic 
countries that the United States represents a better, more egalitarian way of life, 
the U.S. appears hypocritical when it engages in racial profiling of Black and 
Brown motorists and imprisons mostly persons of color.179 
4.  Other Reform 
The ways in which interest convergence is used as a tool of strategy or 
prediction are not limited to workplace, educational, and political reform. Joseph 
Lubinski advocates for conscious application of interest convergence theory by 
animal rights activists seeking legislative reform to protect animals.180 Lubinski 
suggests that in order to succeed, animal rights activists need to show how animal 
rights reform benefits humans and not just animals.181 For example, those 
supporting legislation punishing animal abusers might point out that people who 
abuse animals often go on to abuse human beings.182 To improve the lives of farm 
animals, animal rights activists might point out the potential health risks to humans 
from practices such as injecting farm animals with high doses of antibiotics that 
remain in the slaughtered animals’ tissues only to be later ingested by 
consumers.183 People who oppose the slaughter of animals for human consumption 
can point to the health benefits of a vegetarian diet, including cancer prevention 
and control.184 
In the domestic violence arena, Adele Morrison uses interest convergence 
theory to support a shift from a white-centered battered women discourse to a 
multicultural version with battered women of color at the center.185 In 
Deconstructing the Image Repertoire of Women of Color, Morrison explores the 
ways in which whiteness permeates legal discussion of domestic violence to the 
detriment of all victims of intimate abuse, but particularly victims of color.186 She 
calls for a multicultural approach, arguing that battered white women’s interests 
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converge with those of battered women of color in having a responsive legal 
system.187 
III. CULTURAL CONVERGENCE THEORY 
Just as interest convergence theory helps us understand the forces that 
may have motivated certain Supreme Court decisions beneficial to minorities such 
as Brown and Hernandez, cultural convergence theory can help us understand why 
certain cultural defense arguments seem to be more successful than others. 
Cultural convergence is the idea that a “cultural defense” is more likely to succeed 
when the cultural norms underlying an immigrant or minority defendant’s cultural 
defense claim converge with the cultural norms of American society.188 Like 
interest convergence theory, cultural convergence theory can be used to explain the 
underlying forces behind a particular decision or series of decisions. It might also 
be used as an affirmative tool of strategy or prediction.189 Cultural convergence, 
however, focuses on the presence or absence of overlapping cultural norms as 
opposed to converging interests.  
Three generally successful cultural defenses illustrate cultural 
convergence. A fourth type of cultural defense, which is rarely successful, reflects 
cultural norm convergence in its successful application. These successful cultural 
defenses often reinforce racial or ethnic stereotypes. 
First, Asian immigrant men who have killed their unfaithful Asian 
immigrant wives have successfully claimed that in light of their cultural 
background, they were reasonably provoked into a heat of passion and should not 
be convicted of murder. Such claims, however, are not culturally unique. In this 
country, we have a long history of excusing American men who kill their 
unfaithful wives.190 In other words, the reason behind the success of the Asian 
immigrant man’s provocation claim may not be not so much because of his 
immigrant status, but rather because his underlying claim is familiar and resonates 
with the judge and jury. Moreover, while acceptance of such claims is often 
viewed as a positive sign that Americans are willing to accept immigrants and their 
                                                                                                                
187. Id. at 1115. 
188. Not all successful “cultural defense” cases can be explained as the result of 
cultural norm convergence. See, e.g., State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996) (vacating 
conviction on two counts of gross sexual assault arising from Afghan father’s kissing of his 
18-month-old son’s penis after considering testimony on the Afghani practice and custom of 
kissing a young son’s penis to show love for the child); see also Wanderer & Connors, 
supra note 6. However, given that most attempts to use culture as a defense tactic are 
unsuccessful, the apparent convergence of cultural norms in many of the cases where 
cultural evidence is successfully employed is all the more striking. 
189. In this Article, I use cultural convergence to explain the successful use of 
cultural evidence in four types of cultural defense cases. While cultural convergence might 
also be useful as an affirmative tool of strategy or prediction, my focus in this Article is on 
cultural convergence as explanation. I leave for another day (or for other legal scholars) the 
discussion of cultural convergence as an affirmative tool of strategy or prediction as well as 
other possible applications of cultural convergence theory to explain trends in cases outside 
the cultural defense arena. 
190. See LEE, supra note 27, ch. 1. 
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different cultures, such acceptance also reflects and reinforces negative stereotypes 
about Asian men as barbaric foreigners who do not value human life as much as 
Americans do. 
Second, Asian immigrant women who attempt to commit parent-child 
suicide in response to spousal infidelity, but succeed only in killing the children, 
are often found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. While at first glance it 
appears that the cultural background of the immigrant female defendant plays a 
key role in mitigating murder charges down to manslaughter, it turns out that many 
American women who kill their children under similar circumstances are also 
convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. Gender role stereotyping, depicting 
the woman as emotionally weak and dependent upon her husband for her 
happiness, as opposed to cultural difference, may explain the mitigation in these 
kinds of cases. 
Third, when a Hmong man charged with rape claims he thought the sex 
was consensual given the Hmong cultural practice of marriage by capture and the 
prosecutor allows him to plead guilty to a lesser offense, it may appear at first 
glance that the prosecutor is giving undue weight to the defendant’s cultural claim. 
However, plea bargaining is not uncommon in America. In some jurisdictions, as 
many as ninety-six percent of all criminal cases end in a plea agreement prior to 
trial.191 In date rape cases in particular, it is fairly common for the prosecutor to 
accede to a plea bargain because of the uncertainties involved in trying a “he 
said/she said” case. In other words, the Hmong defendant succeeds in having his 
rape charge mitigated not necessarily because the prosecutor places a high value 
on cultural difference, but because the underlying claim reflects a familiar 
American cultural norm. A defendant who reasonably believes a woman has 
consented to sexual intercourse is not guilty of forcible rape. Accepting the Hmong 
defendant’s claim not only comports with this tradition, it also reinforces negative 
stereotypes about Asian males as misogynistic foreigners who mistreat women.  
Finally, when an African-American man charged with a crime of violence 
against a white man claims “Black Rage” or some other race-based deviance 
defense and wins an acquittal of the most serious charges leveled against him, 
cultural convergence is difficult to see because no comparable “White Rage” 
defense would be available for a Caucasian charged similarly. Nonetheless, 
cultural convergence can also help explain these cases. A Black Rage defense 
reinforces stereotypes about Black men as dangerous, violent criminals—
stereotypes that prevail in our society today.192 
                                                                                                                
191. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS fig. c (2006); Brian Kleinhaus, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal 
or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the 
Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2764 (2005). 
Tina Olson reports that after passage of California’s Three Strikes law, “plea agreements [in 
California] totaled ninety-one percent of the felony convictions.” Tina M. Olson, Strike 
One, Ready for More? The Consequences of Plea Bargaining “First Strike” Offenders 
Under California’s “Three Strikes” Law, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 545, 561 (2000). 
192. See LEE, supra note 27, at 120–21; see also SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING 
WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND 
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The successful cultural defense both resonates with dominant cultural 
norms and is cabined or particularized through the cultural link so the legal 
decision-maker does not feel a favorable decision will open the floodgates to 
leniency. Judges, jurors, and prosecutors attempting to be culturally sensitive often 
end up reinforcing negative stereotypes about the racial or ethnic group of the 
defendant. 
A. Asian Immigrant Men Who Kill Their Unfaithful Asian Immigrant Wives 
When an Asian immigrant man kills his wife after discovering she has 
been unfaithful, he may claim that his behavior was culturally motivated and that 
therefore he should not be punished as a murderer. One of the most notorious of 
these cases is People v. Chen.193 Dong Lu Chen, an immigrant from China, was 
charged with second-degree murder for killing his wife by striking her eight times 
over the head with a claw hammer after she confessed to adultery and refused to 
have sex with him.194 At a bench trial, Chen’s attorney called Burton Pasternak, a 
cultural anthropologist who had done fieldwork in China, to testify that Chen’s 
violent reaction to his wife’s confession was not at all unusual given his Chinese 
cultural background. Pasternak testified that “one could expect a Chinese to react 
in a much more volatile, violent way to those circumstances” than an American 
man195 because a wife’s adultery was considered a stain on the husband, who 
would be viewed as unable to maintain control of his wife.196 In other words, it 
was reasonable for Chen, a Chinese man, to become provoked by his wife’s 
infidelity.197  
Pasternak further testified that “in traditional Chinese culture, due to 
societal beliefs concerning infidelity, a Chinese man might threaten to kill his wife 
                                                                                                                
CLASSROOMS 60 (1998) (discussing the “culturalization of racism” wherein “Black 
inferiority is attributed to ‘cultural deficiency, social inadequacy, and technological 
underdevelopment’”). 
193. For a detailed account of the Chen case, see Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, 
supra note 6, at 64–77. For descriptions of other cases involving Asian immigrant men who 
killed their Asian immigrant wives and made a cultural claim that they were provoked by 
their wife’s infidelity, see Lee, supra note 27, at 113–17. 
194. See Chiu, The Cultural Defense, supra note 6, at 1053 (noting that 
prosecutors initially charged Chen with second-degree murder, and that Chen was convicted 
of second-degree manslaughter). 
195. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 66. 
196. Id. at 69. 
197. While some accounts of the Chen case report that the defense asserted was 
insanity, Chen’s attorney, Stewart Orden, asserts that the thrust of the defense was that at 
the moment of the attack, Chen was unable to form a specific intent to kill or seriously 
injure. Email from Stewart Orden, attorney for Dong Lu Chen, to author (Mar. 15, 2007) 
(on file with author). Orden also argued that Chen acted under the influence of an extreme 
emotional disturbance (the Model Penal Code’s version of the provocation defense). See 
Coleman, Culture, Cloaked in Mens Rea, supra note 6, at 985; Telephone Interview by 
Philip Cardinale with Stewart Orden, attorney for Dong Lu Chen (Aug. 29, 2005) (“[The] 
defense was that it was extreme emotional distress but it was so extreme as to render any 
intentionality on [Chen’s] part to be nonexistent at the time he was striking her with the 
hammer. He had formed no intent to cause her injury.”).  
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if she commits adultery. However, the Chinese community usually stops him from 
following through with his threats.”198 Because Chen was in America when he 
discovered his wife’s adultery, he did not have the usual community safeguards in 
place to stop him from killing his wife.199 
Persuaded by these arguments, the judge presiding over Chen’s bench 
trial acquitted Chen of second-degree murder and found him guilty of 
manslaughter.200 He then sentenced Chen to five years of probation.201 Brooklyn 
Supreme Court Justice Edward Pincus explained:  
Were this crime committed by the defendant as someone who was 
born and raised in America, or born elsewhere but primarily raised 
in America, even in the Chinese American community, the Court 
would have been constrained to find the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter in the first degree. But, this Court cannot ignore . . . 
the very cogent forceful testimony of Doctor Pasternak, who is, 
perhaps, the greatest expert in America on China and interfamilial 
relationships.202 
The judge concluded that Chen “was the product of his culture. . . . The 
culture was never an excuse, but it is something that made him crack more easily. 
That was the factor, the cracking factor.”203 
Although Chen’s case seems like an example of culture winning out over 
all other considerations, cultural convergence may have contributed to the 
outcome. Rather than being culturally unique, Chen’s claim of having acted 
reasonably in response to his wife’s confession of adultery echoes claims of legally 
adequate provocation made by countless American men who have killed their 
                                                                                                                
198. Nicole A. King, The Role of Culture in Psychology: A Look at Mental Illness 
and the “Cultural Defense,” 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 199, 221 (1999) (citing Gallin, 
supra note 6, at 730). 
199. See Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 73. Volpp points out 
that Pasternak’s “bizarre portrayal of divorce and adultery in China in fact had little basis in 
reality.” Id. at 70. When the prosecutor cross-examined Pasternak, he “admitted he could 
not recall a single instance in which a man in China killed his wife [for being unfaithful] or 
having ever heard about such an event, yet he suggested this was accepted in China.” Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
200. There is some confusion over whether Justice Pincus reduced the charge 
from murder to manslaughter, or merely reduced the charge from first-degree manslaughter 
to second-degree manslaughter. Compare Chiu, The Cultural Defense, supra note 6, at 1053 
(noting that prosecutors initially charged Chen with second-degree murder, but that Chen 
was convicted of second-degree manslaughter), with Hoeffel, supra note 21, at 316 (stating 
that Justice Pincus reduced the charge from first-degree manslaughter to second-degree 
manslaughter). According to Stewart Orden, Chen’s attorney, Justice Pincus acquitted Chen 
of second-degree murder and found him guilty of the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter. Email from Stewart Orden to author, supra note 197. The judge found Chen 
guilty of second-degree manslaughter. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 64. 
201. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 64. 
202. Id. at 73 (quoting Transcript of Record at 301–02, People v. Chen, No. 87-
7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988)). 
203. Chiu, The Cultural Defense, supra note 6, at 1053. 
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unfaithful wives.204 At early common law, a husband who killed his wife after 
catching her in flagrante delicto (i.e. in the act of adultery) fell into one of the few 
categories of legally adequate provocation that automatically mitigated a murder 
charge down to voluntary manslaughter. In some jurisdictions, a man who killed 
under such circumstances was guilty of no crime at all.205 In recent times, 
American men who have killed their female partners (or former partners) in 
response to acts as innocuous as dancing with another man have succeeded in 
mitigating their murder charges down to manslaughter by arguing they were acting 
under an extreme emotional disturbance, the Model Penal Code’s version of the 
provocation defense.206 Given this history, it is not surprising that in many cases in 
which an Asian immigrant man has killed his wife in response to her infidelity, the 
defendant benefits from the provocation mitigation.207 He benefits precisely 
because his claim is familiar.208 
Justice Pincus would likely deny that he granted the provocation 
mitigation because of any sympathy for men who kill in response to wifely 
infidelity. Indeed, he was careful to explain that he would have decided the case 
differently had Chen been an American, or even had Chen been a Chinese 
                                                                                                                
204. See LEE, supra note 27, at 114 (“American men who kill their wives, like 
Chen, often base their claim of reasonableness on the threat to masculine honor and identity 
posed by a wife’s sexual infidelity.”). 
205. Id. at 20 (noting that Georgia, Texas, Utah, and New Mexico deemed the 
husband’s killing of his wife or her lover after catching them in the act of adultery a 
justifiable homicide). 
206. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the 
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1405 (1997); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 
210.3(1)(b). 
207. For example, Chanh Van Duong, a Vietnamese immigrant, shot and killed 
his estranged wife outside a courtroom because she wanted a divorce. Duong was charged 
with murder. He argued he was provoked into a sudden heat of passion when he saw his 
wife with her new boyfriend and was convicted of manslaughter. Briefing, COLO. SPRINGS 
GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 12, 1998, at B7. Similarly, May Aphaylath, a Laotian man, 
killed his wife after finding her on the phone with her former boyfriend. At his trial for 
murder, Aphaylath’s attorneys tried to introduce expert witnesses who could testify that in 
Laos, a husband whose wife receives calls from a single man can be expected to lose his 
self-control. The trial judge refused to allow such testimony and Aphaylath was convicted 
of murder. Aphaylath’s conviction was reversed on the ground that the expert testimony 
should have been admitted. Aphaylath then pled guilty to manslaughter. Associated Press, 
Refugee to Get New Murder Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1986, at 54; Robert Bellafiore, 
Court Overturns Laotian Refugee’s Murder Conviction, UPI, Nov. 13, 1986; New Trial in 
Killing, NEWSDAY, Nov. 14, 1986. 
208. Coleman argues that in finding Chen guilty of second-degree manslaughter, 
reckless homicide without intent, Justice Pincus gave Chen more of a break than a similarly 
situated non-Chinese American would have received. Coleman, Culture, Cloaked in Mens 
Rea, supra note 6, at 987. While it is true that one who is provoked into a heat of passion 
normally will have his (or her) murder charge reduced to voluntary manslaughter as this is 
what the law permits, a judge or jury has the power to be more lenient than otherwise 
required by the law. Chen is not the only man in the United States who has killed his wife in 
response to her infidelity and received more leniency than what the law would require. See 
LEE, supra note 27, ch. 1. 
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American.209 Ostensibly, Chen’s Asian immigrant culture was the deciding factor 
for the judge. Social science research on cognition, however, suggests that 
expressed attitudes often mask true attitudes as the subject may feel the need to 
conform to socially accepted norms.210  
Given the contested meaning of spousal infidelity killings in American 
society today, the judge may have relied on “culture” as reflected in anthropologist 
Burton Pasternak’s rendition of Chinese culture to justify a decision that may have 
otherwise appeared gender biased. In so doing, his decision to grant leniency to 
Chen reinforced the long-standing American cultural norm that empathizes with a 
husband who kills after discovering his wife has committed adultery.211  
Sarah Song notes that patriarchal mainstream norms often shape the 
frameworks within which minority claims are evaluated.212 According to Song, 
“there is a striking congruence in the norms of majority and minority cultures 
regarding the realm of intimate relations between the sexes,” a congruence that 
helps us understand why cultural defense claims tend to be successful when they 
involve intimate sexual relations and stories of betrayal.213 This phenomenon is not 
unique to American courts. Anne Phillips observes that cultural arguments raised 
                                                                                                                
209. See Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 73 (quoting Transcript 
of Record at 301–02, People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988)). 
210  See Robert S. Chang & Rose Cuison Villazor, “Testing the ‘Model Minority 
Myth’”: A Case of Weak Empiricism, 2007 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 101, 106 (2007) 
(discussing the gap between attitudes as expressed and people’s “true” attitudes). One 
empirical study, for example, tested bias against the disabled. Vanessa Lynn Ewing et al., 
Student Prejudice Against Gay Male and Lesbian Lecturers, 143 J. SOC. PSYCH. 569 (2003) 
(discussing M.L. Snyder et al., Avoidance of the Handicapped: An Attributional Ambiguity 
Analysis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 2297 (1979)). Participants in that study were 
asked to choose one of two rooms in which to watch a movie. The researchers found that 
when the same movie was playing in both rooms, and a disabled person sat in one room 
while the other room was empty, most participants chose to sit in the room with the person 
in the wheelchair, and sat down next to the disabled person. When researchers offered two 
different movies, one in an empty room, and one playing in a room with a disabled person, 
most participants chose to watch the movie in the empty room, regardless of the movie that 
was playing there. Robert Chang and Rose Cuison Villazor explain these results: 
The results from the first situation accord with social norms about how 
one should act towards those with different abilities. Though participants 
might prefer not to sit next to the person in the wheelchair, the fear of 
appearing prejudiced led them to overcome that preference. The results 
from the second situation, though, show that the force of the social 
norms is insufficient to overcome the participants’ preferences when 
they can justify or rationalize their behavior as being based on movie 
choice and not prejudice. Thus, . . . conclusions drawn from the 
expressed attitudes [in the General Social Survey context] are likely to 
tell us little about real world discrimination. 
Chang & Villazor, supra, at 6. 
211. See LEE, supra note 27, ch. 1. 
212. Sarah Song, Majority Norms, Multiculturalism, and Gender Equality, 99 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 473, 480 (2005) (calling the support offered by mainstream gender norms to 
gender hierarchies in minority cultural communities the “congruence effect”). 
213. Id. 
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by minority defendants in English cases are most effective when they resonate 
with mainstream patriarchal English conventions.214 
An additional dynamic may underlie the appeal of culture in cases 
involving Asian men who kill their unfaithful wives: the reinforcement of negative 
stereotypes about Asians and Asian Americans. While less empirical research has 
been conducted on stereotypes about Asians than about other minority groups, 
those in the Asian American community are well aware of the many stereotypes 
about Asians that others consciously or unconsciously embrace.215 
                                                                                                                
214. Anne Phillips, When Culture Means Gender: Issues of Cultural Defence in 
the English Courts, 4 MOD. L. REV. 510 (2003). 
215. Several Asian American scholars have written about these stereotypes. See, 
e.g., ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 48 
(1999) [hereinafter CHANG, DISORIENTED]; LEE, supra note 27, at 159–74 (discussing three 
stereotypes about Asian Americans, including the Asian-as-Foreigner stereotype, the Asian-
as-Model Minority stereotype, and the Asian-as-Martial Artist stereotype); FRANK H. WU, 
YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., 
RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001) 
[hereinafter YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION]; Keith Aoki, “Foreign-
ness” and Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and 
Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 1 (1996) (“From the beginning of 
judicial review of first Chinese Americans and then Japanese Americans in the nineteenth 
century, there has been a persistent view that the racial identity of Asians within the United 
States, even those born here and culturally assimilated, [was] distinctly ‘foreign.’” (citation 
omitted)); Chang & Villazor, supra note 210 (discussing the model minority myth); Robert 
S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1993) [hereinafter Chang, 
Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship]; Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The 
“Reticent” Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 14 (1994) 
(discussing the Asian-as-Foreigner stereotype and noting that historically, Americans have 
viewed Japanese immigrants as militaristic and aggressive); Gabriel J. Chin et al., Beyond 
Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community of Justice: A Policy Analysis 
of Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129 (1996); Sumi K. Cho, Converging 
Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie 
Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 186 (1997) (examining the ways in which the model 
minority stereotype converges with “stock portrayal[s] of obedient and servile Asian Pacific 
American women in popular culture”); Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the “Miss 
Saigon Syndrome,” in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 1087 (Hyung-Chan 
Kim ed., 1994) [hereinafter Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the “Miss Saigon 
Syndrome”]; Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Beyond Black and White: Racializing Asian 
Americans in a Society Obsessed with O.J., 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 165 (1995) 
(discussing racial stereotypes about the Asian Americans involved in the O.J. Simpson 
trial); Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of “Foreignness” in the 
Construction of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN L.J. 71, 71 (1997) (“By 
characterizing those of Asian descent as ‘foreigners,’ dominant society is able to slip freely 
from the model minority to the yellow peril label.”); Leti Volpp, On Culture, Difference, 
and Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 393, 397 (2003) (noting that 
many writers have “assert[ed] that there is something more misogynistic about Asian 
immigrant communities than ‘our own’”); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian 
Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995) [hereinafter Wu, 
Neither Black Nor White] (providing both a historical account of the model minority myth 
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One common stereotype about Asian Americans is the “Asian-as-Model 
Minority” stereotype which “depicts Asian Americans as achieving success 
through cultural values and hard work.”216 The “Asian-as-Model Minority” 
stereotype works as both a blessing and a curse: it supports the view that Asian 
Americans are smart and hard-working, but it can foster hostility against persons 
of Asian descent who are seen as a monolithic group taking valuable jobs and 
educational opportunities away from “real” Americans.217 
For example, Asian Americans are often resented for taking up space at 
elite schools. At the University of California at Los Angeles (“UCLA”), a common 
joke for a while was that UCLA stood for United Caucasians Lost Among 
Asians.218 Sometimes this resentment against Asians can lead to adverse changes 
in admissions policies. In 1984, for example, the University of California at 
Berkeley (“U.C. Berkeley”), regarded as the flagship of the University of 
California system, implemented a policy raising the requisite verbal score for 
                                                                                                                
and an explanation of the modern model minority myth); Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, or Foe 
or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and Reparations, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 223, 236 (1992) (noting that the unspoken message conveyed through Japan bashing 
is that “unscrupulous Asians [are] stealing United States business opportunities”); Rhoda J. 
Yen, Racial Stereotyping of Asians and Asian Americans and Its Effect on Criminal Justice: 
A Reflection on the Wayne Lo Case, 7 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing the Asian-as-Model 
Minority and Asian-as-Yellow Peril stereotypes); Neil Gotanda, “Other Non-whites” in 
American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1191 (1985) 
(book review) (discussing the “notion of ‘foreignness’” as one of the critical features of 
legal treatment of Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans); Jerry Kang, Note, Racial 
Violence Against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1926, 1935 (1993) (noting that 
during times of economic strife, racial hostility towards all Asian Americans increases 
because of “the misperception that Asian Americans ‘steal’ valuable” job opportunities 
from more deserving Americans). 
216. Chang & Villazor, supra note 210, at 101. Rhoda Yen notes that “the post-
1965 Asian immigrants were largely drawn from the wealthiest and most educated groups in 
their native countries” and that “[a]s exposure to this minority group increased, white 
Americans may have formed their ideas of Asian Americans from the limited number of 
wealthy, educated Asians who lived and worked among them.” Yen, supra note 215, at 2–3. 
For additional discussion of the model minority stereotype, see YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, 
RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 215, at 267–69; Chew, supra note 215; Chin et al., 
supra note 215; Saito, supra note 215; Wu, Neither Black Nor White, supra note 215. 
217. In Testing the “Model Minority Myth,” Miranda Oshige McGowan and 
James Lindgren argue that empirical data do not support the belief that white Americans 
hold negative stereotypes associated with viewing Asian Americans as a “model minority.” 
Miranda Oshige McGowan & James Lindgren, Testing the “Model Minority Myth,” 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 331 (2006). In response, Robert Chang and Rose Cuison Villazor show that 
McGowan and Lindgren’s argument is flawed because it relies heavily on data produced by 
asking white respondents about their racial attitudes in face-to-face interviews. Chang and 
Villazor assert that this methodology is unlikely to yield true data about racial attitudes as it 
is infected with problems of response falsification and cannot ferret out subtler forms of 
racial bias. Chang & Villazor, supra note 210, at 103. 
218. John Schwartz et al., The “Eastern Capital” of Asia, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 
1988, at 56 (“At UCLA, where Asians make up upwards of 18 percent of the student body, 
Anglo students joke that the school’s initials really stand for ‘United Caucasians Lost 
Among Asians.’”). 
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immigrants on the SAT to 400 and automatically redirecting applications of Asian 
American students eligible for the Educational Opportunity Program to other U.C. 
campuses.219 This policy had the effect of substantially limiting the number of 
Asians admitted to U.C. Berkeley.220 Initially, university officials denied that the 
minimum SAT score for immigrants policy had been implemented, claiming that 
the policy was discussed orally, but never adopted in written form.221 However, 
“[f]ollowing two years of heated, public exchanges over the reasons behind the 
unexpected drop in [Asian American admissions] in 1984 and mounting public 
skepticism over the university’s handling of the Asian American concerns, the 
California Auditor General, acting on a request by the State Legislature, conducted 
an extensive, independent audit of Berkeley’s admissions records for the period 
1981 to 1987.”222 Following this audit, the SAT policy memo surfaced223 and with 
it an apology from Berkeley Chancellor Ira Michael Heyman to the Asian 
community on the University’s lack of sensitivity in handling the charges of bias 
in Asian admissions.224 
Another common trope is the “Asian-as-Foreigner” stereotype. Neil 
Gotanda notes that “[f]rom the beginning of judicial review of first Chinese 
Americans and then Japanese Americans in the nineteenth century, there has been 
a persistent view that the racial identity of Asians within the United States, even 
those born here, and culturally assimilated, [is] distinctly ‘foreign.’”225 This 
perception that persons of Asian descent are foreign-born persists today. Well-
meaning Americans will often remark that they are impressed at how well an 
Asian American speaks English. The unstated assumption is that this Asian person 
came from a country in Asia and had to learn English as a second language. 
Sometimes the assumption of foreignness becomes very clear as when someone 
asks an Asian American where he or she comes from. When the Asian American 
replies, “Oakland, California,” the questioner persists, often asking, “No, I mean 
where do you really come from?”226 
                                                                                                                
219. Dana Y. Takagi, From Discrimination to Affirmative Action: Facts in the 
Asian American Admissions Controversy, 37 SOC. PROBS. 578, 580 (1990). 
220. The number of Asian American freshmen at U.C. Berkeley dropped from 
1,239 in 1983 to 1,008 in 1984. L. Ling-Chi Wang, Meritocracy and Diversity in Higher 
Education: Discrimination Against Asian Americans in the Post-Bakke Era, 4 INST. FOR 
SOC. SCI. RES. 1, 5 (1988). Wang notes that “with the exception of [Filipino] Americans, 
who were protected by an affirmative action program, every Asian American sub-group 
registered a decline” in admissions. Id. “The sharpest reduction occurred among Chinese 
American freshmen, dropping from 609 in 1983 to 418 in 1984 or by 30% in one year. By 
comparison, White freshmen admissions declined by only 4%, from 2,425 to 2,327.” Id.; 
see also Grace W. Tsuang, Note, Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly 
Selective Universities, 98 YALE L.J. 659, 674 (1989). 
221. Takagi, supra note 219, at 580 n.2. 
222. Wang, supra note 220, at 6. 
223. Takagi, supra note 219, at 580 n.2. 
224. Id. at 587. 
225. Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the “Miss Saigon Syndrome,” supra 
note 215, at 1095. 
226. Professor Pat Chew recounts the following: 
948 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 49:911 
 
While the “Asian-as-Foreigner” stereotype seems innocuous on the 
surface, it can contribute to acts of violence against Asians. Jerry Kang notes that 
Asian Americans are often targets of robbery because of the misperception that all 
Asians distrust banks and carry a lot of cash.227 In another example of violence 
against Asian Americans arising from perceptions of foreignness, Vincent Chin, a 
Chinese American man, was beaten to death with a baseball bat in Detroit, 
Michigan by two men who thought Chin was Japanese and somehow responsible 
for declining American automobile sales.228 Chin had gone to a strip bar to 
celebrate his upcoming marriage. Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz, two white men, 
were sitting directly across from Chin and his group of friends. They started 
calling Chin a “Nip” (a derogatory term for a person of Japanese descent, derived 
from the word “Nippon” which is the Japanese word for Japan) and one yelled, 
“It’s because of you little mother fuckers that we’re out of work.” Chin got up and 
went over to Ebens and threw a punch. A scuffle ensued and Chin, Ebens and Nitz 
were asked to leave the bar. Ebens retrieved a baseball bat from Nitz’s car and 
began chasing Chin. When the two men caught up with him, Ebens struck Chin 
repeatedly in the head with the baseball bat. Chin died four days later. As Robert 
Chang explains: 
People like Chin were making people like Ebens and Nitz lose their 
jobs. Even though Ebens was still employed as a foreman in an 
automobile plant, he clearly identified with laid-off autoworkers. 
But there was more. Chin was displacing them as (the rightful) 
consumers of sexual attention. Here we have economics, race, 
gender, and sexuality coming together in interesting ways. Loss of 
jobs entails a loss of masculinity. The loss of masculinity was 
caused by a racial and foreign Other, an Asian man who in many 
ways was just like them. The bonding that might normally take 
                                                                                                                
When people first meet me, it is not unusual for them to comment, 
“You speak so well, you don’t have an accent,” intending their 
observation to be a compliment. “Where are you from?” they continue, 
expecting my response to be a more foreign and exotic place than Texas 
or Pennsylvania.  
A tall red-haired, casually dressed gentleman that I didn’t know 
recently knocked on my office door. “Yes?” I greeted. “Sorry to interrupt 
you,” he stammered, “I was visiting the law school and I saw the name 
on your door, and old family friends are named ‘Chew,’ and I thought 
you might be related, but” he paused, “I can see I’m wrong. They’re 
American.” 
Chew, supra note 215, at 33 (emphasis added); see also LEE, supra note 27, at 165–70 
(discussing the Asian-as-Foreigner stereotype). 
227. Kang, supra note 215. 
228. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1427 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated on 
other grounds by Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); Chang, Toward an 
Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 215, at 1252–53; Paula C. Johnson, The 
Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema Verite and the Pedagogy of 
Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347 (1996); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-
Defense: Toward a Normative Construction of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 
(1996); WHO KILLED VINCENT CHIN? (Film News Now Foundation & WTVS-Detroit Public 
Television 1988). 
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place between men in a strip club is disrupted by Chin’s Asianness. 
Further, the Asian man may be improperly consuming the sexual 
attention of a white woman, which, in part, he is able to do because 
he is doing well, economically, by displacing people like Ebens and 
Nitz from their jobs. We have, then, a double displacement along 
with a threat to racial purity, a threat to the very whiteness that 
provides their sense of place and entitlement in America.229 
The “Asian-as-Foreigner” stereotype spawns other deeply entrenched 
perceptions about Asians and Asian Americans. Asian culture, in contrast to 
Western culture, is considered uniquely misogynistic and patriarchal.230 Asians are 
thought not to value human life to the same extent as Americans. For example, 
Keith Aoki writes about “the enduring popularity in the United States of the hari-
kiri/kamikaze stereotype, which began circulating during World War II as 
supposed evidence of the lack of value placed on individual human life by the 
Japanese.”231 Darrell Hamamoto notes that a similar image of the Vietnamese as 
ruthless individuals who placed little or no value on human life surfaced during the 
Vietnam War.232 The confluence of these images contributes to an “Asian-as-
Yellow Peril” stereotype, which reflects the view that persons of Asian descent are 
not just foreigners, but foreigners with inferior cultural practices and behaviors.233 
In Dong Lu Chen’s case, the lenient sentence ostensibly based on Chen’s cultural 
background reinforced the popular perception that Chinese men are more 
patriarchal and misogynistic than American men.  
In explaining his verdict and sentence in cultural terms, Justice Pincus 
was giving Western culture “an implicit . . . pat on the back for [its] 
progressiveness and fairness.”234 At the same time, under the guise of cultural 
sensitivity, the judge’s ruling strengthened the image of a patriarchal Chinese 
culture where men brutally beat their unfaithful wives to death.235 American 
mainstream culture “was the implicit backdrop”236—a place where this kind of 
                                                                                                                
229. CHANG, DISORIENTED, supra note 215, at 24–25. 
230. Cho, supra note 215, at 184 (noting that in the 19th century, “[s]ensational 
newspaper headlines reflected the widespread characterization[s] of [Asian Pacific 
American] women as the abused chattel of brutal Chinese proprietors”); Yen Ling Shek, 
Asian American Masculinity: A Review of the Literature, 14 J. MEN’S STUD. 379, 381 
(2006) (noting that the popular American movie The Joy Luck Club portrayed Asian 
American men “as misogynistic and cheap”); Volpp, supra note 215, at 393 (noting that 
legal scholars often depict Asian immigrant communities as more misogynistic than 
Western communities). 
231. Aoki, supra note 215, at 38. 
232. DARRELL Y. HAMAMOTO, MONITORED PERIL: ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE 
POLITICS OF TV REPRESENTATION 156 (1994) (“[T]he dehumanized Asians—‘dinks,’ 
‘gooks,’ and ‘slopes’—place a low premium on life itself.”). 
233. Yen, supra note 215, at 6; see also Saito, supra note 215, at 90–93 
(identifying harms to Asian Americans arising from the ascription of foreignness). 
234. Sonia N. Lawrence, Cultural (In)Sensitivity: The Dangers of a Simplified 
Approach to Culture in the Courtroom, 13 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 107, 117 (2001). 
235. See id. at 113 (discussing the bail hearing for a Sri Lankan man charged with 
beating and burning two female cousins for talking to boys at school). 
236. Id. 
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behavior is unacceptable.237 Like many judges and jurors deciding guilt or 
punishment in cultural defense cases, Justice Pincus was unable to discern the 
similarities between Chinese cultural practices and Western practices.238 
What happens in courtrooms where cultural claims are asserted, 
according to Sonia Lawrence, “can be seen as a modern project of racialization, 
namely a more ‘sophisticated’ version of the blunt attribution of inferior traits to 
non-Whites that thereby attaches the inferiority label not to the individuals but 
rather to their culture.”239 For example, in cases involving dowry murders, “an 
aspect of the phenomenon dissimilar to the experience in Western cultures, the use 
of fire as a murder weapon, becomes the central focus of the ‘Othering’ project.”240 
Any similarity to Western cultural practices such as domestic violence is 
“systematically effaced and obscured through a selective gaze and presentation.”241 
Thus, when an American burns his wife or girlfriend,242 the defendant’s actions are 
rarely seen as a reflection of American culture. Leti Volpp explains: 
We identify sexual violence in immigrant[s] of color and Third 
World communities as cultural, while failing to recognize the 
cultural aspects of sexual violence affecting white mainstream 
women. This is related to the general failure to look at the behavior 
of white persons as cultural, while always ascribing the label of 
culture to the behavior of minority groups.243 
One problem with the reliance on culture to justify a lenient sentence or 
verdict is that an essentialized view of the defendant’s culture tends to emerge.244 
                                                                                                                
237. See id. at 117. 
238. See id. (“A crucial aspect of the courts’ approach to culture is the seeming 
inability of the judge’s gaze to discern similarity between ‘Third World’ cultural practices 
and those ‘Western’ ones with which the judge is deeply familiar and adjudicates every 
day.”); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post September 11 Racial Violence as 
Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1308 (2004) (“Honor crimes in the Muslim world 
have become a topic of great interest in the West in recent years, but far less attention has 
been paid to how violence in defense of honor operates in the United States.”). 
239. Lawrence, supra note 234, at 112. 
240. Id. at 116. 
241. Id. 
242. See Ruben Castaneda, “He Said He Wanted to Fry Me like Crisco Grease,” 
WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2006, at B1 (On October 10, 2006, Roger Hargrave walked into a T-
Mobile store in Clinton, Maryland where his wife Yvette Cade was working, poured 
gasoline onto her head and shoulders and set her on fire.); Developments in Los Angeles 
County; Man Sets Wife, Mother Afire, Then Surrenders, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at B4 
(A man walked into a police station in Southern California and told police that he had 
doused his wife and her mother with gasoline and set them afire.); Allison Klein & Philip 
Rucker, Woman Set Afire in Landover, WASH. POST, July 30, 2006, at C1 (A “landscaper 
doused his girlfriend with gasoline and set her on fire” in Prince George’s County, 
Maryland on July 29, 2006.); Kris Mayes, Woman Set Afire Was Abused, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, July 29, 1998, at 1B; Eve Sullivan, Man Set Fiancée on Fire, ADVOCATE, Jan. 13, 
2004, at A1 (A Stamford, Connecticut man was charged with attempted murder after 
dousing his 26 year-old fiancée with gasoline and setting her on fire in his van). 
243. Leti Volpp, Feminism and Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1189 
(2001). 
244. Lawrence, supra note 234. 
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Culture is seen through the defendant’s eyes, and the end result is a submerging of 
other views of that culture and an obscuring of the fact that cultural norms change 
over time.245 In the Chen case, Burton Pasternak suggested that Chinese culture is 
uniquely patriarchal, a place where Chinese men feel entitled to fly out of control 
and react with violence if they find out their wife has been unfaithful. While this 
image of China might have been an accurate reflection of Chinese culture in years 
long past, it is questionable whether it accurately reflects culture in today’s China, 
a China that has been communist since 1949 and that at least on paper sees men 
and women as equal comrades in the proletarian struggle.  
B. Asian Immigrant Women Who Kill Their Children in Response to Spousal 
Infidelity 
Another type of case in which cultural evidence seems to be successfully 
deployed involves Asian immigrant women who kill their young children, then 
claim they were so distraught over the discovery that their husbands were seeing 
other women that they attempted to commit parent-child suicide. In Japan, this 
practice even has a name: oya-ko shinju.246 The Japanese mother who decides to 
commit suicide feels obligated to kill her children as well so they are not left in 
this world without a mother to raise them.247 
In People v. Kimura, for example, a Japanese immigrant woman who 
discovered that her husband had been having an affair walked into the Pacific 
Ocean with her two young children in an attempt to kill herself and her children. 
Kimura was rescued, but Kazutaka, her four-year-old son, and Yuri, her six-
month-old daughter, drowned.248 When Kimura was charged with two counts of 
first-degree murder and felony child endangerment, the Japanese-American 
community rallied behind her and gathered more than 25,000 signatures asking for 
leniency.249 Subsequently, the prosecutor allowed Kimura to plead guilty to 
manslaughter, and the judge imposed a sentence of five years of probation and one 
year in jail.250 Since Kimura had already been in jail for more than a year, she 
received credit for time served and was released immediately.251 The prosecutor’s 
decision to plea bargain and the judge’s decision to impose a lenient sentence 
                                                                                                                
245. Id.; Volpp, supra note 3, at 1589–93 (noting that culture is relational and 
fluid and that it is contested within communities). 
246. Matsumoto, supra note 6, at 510–16. 
247. Chiu, supra note 4, at 1353. Chiu writes as follows:  
If Fumiko Kimura had been successful in taking not just her childrens’ 
lives but also her own life, her act of oya-ko shinju would have 
constituted one final act of good parenting. In other words, “it is more 
merciful to kill children than to leave them in the cruel world without 
parental protection.” 
Id. (quoting MAMORU IGA, THE THORN IN THE CHRYSANTHEMUM: SUICIDE AND ECONOMIC 
SUCCESS IN JAPAN 18 (1986)). 
248. Goel, supra note 6, at 443; Woo, supra note 6, at 403. 
249. Woo, supra note 6, at 404. 
250. Goel, supra note 6, at 443–44. 
251. Matsumoto, supra note 6, at 524. 
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appeared to be influenced by the consideration that had Kimura been in her native 
country, Japan, she would have been looked upon with extreme sympathy.252 
Critics of the cultural defense have compared Kimura to Susan Smith, the 
American woman who drowned her two young children by strapping them into 
their car seats, then pushing her car into a lake.253 Smith was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole.254 
Even though both cases concerned mothers who killed their children, the Smith 
case is only superficially analogous to Kimura.255 First, unlike Kimura, Smith 
never attempted to kill herself.256 Smith strapped her kids into their car seats and 
pushed her car into the lake, not directly endangering her own life. Second, at least 
according to the government’s theory, the reason Smith killed her children was not 
to protect them from living in this world without a mother to care for them, but to 
please a former boyfriend who had made it clear that he was not interested in 
continuing a relationship with a single mother burdened with two young 
children.257 
The manslaughter conviction Kimura received is actually consistent with 
the manslaughter convictions received by the majority of American women who 
kill their young children.258 It was Susan Smith’s murder conviction and life 
sentence that were not in keeping with the norm. As Daina Chiu observes: 
Kimura’s sentence of probation and counseling highlights how the 
mainstream recognizes similarity (or assumes similarity) when 
different cultural values or precepts are perceived to be congruent. 
The favorable legal treatment of Fumiko Kimura derives from the 
Anglo-American cultural view that women who kill their children 
are “victims in need of sympathy, support, and psychiatric 
treatment.” Women are “assumed to be inherently passive, gentle, 
and tolerant; and mothers are assumed to be nurturing, caring and 
altruistic. It is an easy step, therefore, to assume that a ‘normal’ 
                                                                                                                
252. Id. at 512 n.29 (noting that in one study, fourteen percent of well-adjusted 
Japanese women responded that they would have done the same thing as the mother who 
attempts parent-child suicide upon learning of her husband’s infidelity). 
253. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 3, at 1142 (opining that “the facts of the Smith 
case were, in all relevant aspects other than culture, the same as those in Kimura”). 
254. Gary Henderson & Clay Murphy, Smith Verdict Met with Mixed Reaction in 
Union, HERALD-J., July 29, 1995, at A1. 
255. See Volpp, supra note 6, at 1583–85 (discussing the misleading analogy 
between parent-suicide cases and the Susan Smith case). 
256. Id. at 1583. 
257. See Rick Bragg, Smith Jury Hears of 2 Little Bodies, and a Letter, in the 
Lake, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at A16 (reporting that Tom Findlay, Susan Smith’s former 
lover, wrote a letter telling Smith that he did not want a relationship that included children). 
258. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern 
American Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (noting that most countries, 
including the United States, “articulate lesser penalties for homicides committed by mothers 
against children”); Jason Wolfe, Maine’s Laws Show Leniency for Child Killers, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, July 12, 1998, at 1A (noting “[t]he vast majority of the time, parents and 
caregivers who kill are charged with manslaughter, not murder”); see also LEE, supra note 
27, at 123 n.125. 
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woman could surely not have acted in such a way. She must have 
been ‘mad’ to kill her own child.”259 
Kimura apparently benefited from these underlying Anglo-American cultural 
norms. Even though the Kimura case is often presented as an example of a 
successful use of cultural evidence, her cultural claim may not have succeeded had 
it not resonated with Anglo-American norms. 
Another case involving an Asian mother who killed her child and then 
tried but failed to kill herself is People v. Wu.260 Helen Wu was initially convicted 
of second-degree murder and sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life.261 She 
appealed, claiming the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested jury 
instruction on how her cultural background might have affected her state of mind 
at the time she killed her son.262 The court of appeals agreed with Wu, reversed her 
murder conviction, and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to instruct jurors 
on retrial that they could consider Wu’s cultural background in deciding whether 
she possessed the mental state necessary for a murder conviction.263 On retrial, Wu 
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.264 
Wu’s claim that her cultural background influenced her behavior does not 
seem as compelling as Kimura’s claim. Wu killed her nine-year-old son whom she 
had not seen or taken care of in years.265 Wu left her son when he was just a 
newborn because she was afraid of damage to her personal reputation. She had 
already abandoned Sidney once. Wu’s claim that she killed Sidney so she would 
not abandon him again seems disingenuous given her absence from Sidney’s life 
for much of his nine years.  
Nonetheless, Wu was successful in mitigating her murder conviction to 
manslaughter, and cultural convergence appears to have played a role in this 
                                                                                                                
259. Chiu, The Cultural Defense, supra note 6, at 1117 (citation omitted). 
260. 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1991). Helen was born and raised in China. She 
came to the United States and conceived a child with Gary Wu in 1979. When Gary did not 
propose marriage, Helen went back to Macau and left her newborn son, Sidney, with his 
father because she did not want people in Macau to know that she had borne a baby out of 
wedlock. Helen already had a daughter from a previous marriage. In 1989, at Gary’s urging, 
Helen came back to the United States and married him in Las Vegas. Eight days after the 
wedding, nine-year-old Sidney told his mother that the house where they were staying 
belonged to Gary’s girlfriend, Rosemary. Helen told Sidney that she wanted to die and 
asked him if he would go with her. When Sidney cried and hugged his mother, she cut the 
cord off a window blind and strangled him. Helen then slashed her wrist and lay on the bed 
next to her son. Gary returned several hours later and rushed Helen to the hospital where she 
was revived. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 85–86. 
261. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 84. 
262. Id. at 84–85. 
263. Id. at 86. Interestingly, the California Supreme Court denied the 
government’s petition for review, but then directed the Reporter of Decisions not to publish 
the appellate court opinion in the Official Appellate Reports. People v. Wu, No. S024083, 
1992 Cal. LEXIS 310, at *1(Cal. Jan. 23, 1992). 
264. Levine, supra note 2, at 65. Wu was sentenced to eleven years in prison. Id.; 
see also Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense Partial Excuse, supra note 6, at 
474. 
265. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 6, at 85–86. 
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success. Professor Juris C. Draguns, a clinical psychologist and expert in cross-
cultural psychology, testified at Wu’s trial about parent–child suicide by American 
mothers living in Chicago in the 1920s.266 Draguns testified that these mothers did 
not regard their infant children as separate children, but saw them as part of 
themselves.267 Professor Leti Volpp notes that Draguns’ testimony “helped to 
collapse cultural differences between ‘American’ and ‘Chinese’ culture.”268 
Even though Wu’s plea for sympathy was not particularly persuasive, she 
may have succeeded in reducing her murder conviction to manslaughter in part 
because of gendered stereotypes about women as nurturing, caring, and altruistic 
mothers.  
C. Hmong Men Claiming “Marriage by Capture” 
Another type of case involving a “cultural defense” involves Hmong men 
charged with forcible rape who claim that because of the Hmong custom of zij paj 
niam (“marriage by capture”), they thought the sex was consensual.269 Many such 
cases start with an arrest and the filing of criminal charges, but “in the majority of 
[these] cases, the prosecutor will reduce or drop charges in exchange for a plea.”270 
For example, in 1985, a twenty-three-year-old Hmong man from Laos named 
Kong Moua took a nineteen-year-old Hmong woman named Seng Xiong, also 
from Laos, from her dormitory room at Fresno City College in Central California 
to a close relative’s home, and there had sexual intercourse with her several times. 
Xiong did not report the incident to the police right away, and later, when she did, 
told them that she had not been sexually molested. Only much later did Xiong 
report to the police that she had been raped.271   
Charged with rape and kidnapping, Moua defended his actions as dictated 
by the Hmong cultural practice of “marriage by capture.” Under this practice, a 
                                                                                                                
266. Id. at 90. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. RENTELN, supra note 4, at 127–28; Ly, supra note 6; George M. Scott, Jr., To 
Catch or Not To Catch a Thief: A Case of Bride Theft Among the Lao Hmong Refugees in 
Southern California, 7 ETHNIC GROUPS 137 (1988) (describing a case involving a Hmong 
man from Orange County who abducted a Laotian girl from her home in San Diego, took 
her to the apartment of one of his cousins in Orange County, and repeatedly forced her to 
engage in sexual relations with him, all for the purpose of marrying the sixteen-year-old 
girl). 
270. See Ly, supra note 6, at 480. Not all cases involving Hmong men charged 
with rape result in a plea bargain and lowered charges because of cultural evidence. See, 
e.g., State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1993) (Hmong man found guilty of raping two 
Hmong women despite testimony by the leader of a Hmong group suggesting that the 
victims did not behave as if they had been raped); State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994) (despite defendant’s testimony that rape as it is understood in American culture 
does not exist in Hmong culture, defendant was convicted of rape). 
271. For a complete account of this case, see Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra 
note 6. 
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Hmong man will take his bride-to-be from her home, bring her to his family home, 
then force her to have sexual intercourse with him to consummate the marriage.272 
Moua argued that given his cultural background, he honestly and 
reasonably believed Xiong had consented to the intercourse.273 In most American 
jurisdictions, an honest and reasonable belief in consent is an affirmative defense 
to a charge of forcible rape.274 In light of Xiong’s failure to immediately report the 
rape, prosecutors allowed Moua to plead guilty to false imprisonment for which he 
was ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution and received three months in jail.275  
The Moua case is often used as an example of a successful cultural 
defense strategy. Instead of being convicted of two felonies (rape and kidnapping), 
Moua was convicted of false imprisonment, a misdemeanor. Moua’s cultural claim 
clearly contributed to his mitigated charge by making his claim of honest and 
reasonable belief in consent more believable. However, plea bargains are not that 
unusual in acquaintance rape cases in which the defendant claims he honestly and 
reasonably believed his female friend consented. Particularly when there is little 
evidence of force and the case boils down to a “he said” versus “she said” war of 
credibility, the prosecution may believe that a plea bargain is the best way to 
secure a conviction. In this country, we have a long history of giving male rape 
defendants the benefit of the doubt when the victim is a friend or an intimate.276 
Accordingly, the decision to allow a plea bargain in Kong Moua’s case may have 
been more a function of contested views on the social harm of date rape and weak 
evidence than cultural difference. Even though numerous studies suggest that 
American women often say “no” when they mean “yes,”277 to openly acknowledge 
this would contradict socially accepted norms held by a good segment of today’s 
society. Moua’s “no” means “yes” argument was able to prevail perhaps because it 
was dressed up as an exotic “cultural” claim. 
Additionally, the Moua case is often presented as a case involving 
sensitivity to cultural difference when it arguably perpetuated cultural racism.278 
Hmong culture was depicted as barbaric, an imagined place where men kidnap the 
women they want to marry, force them to have sexual intercourse against their 
                                                                                                                
272. Ly, supra note 6, at 478–80 (describing three Hmong marriage practices, 
including marriage by capture). 
273. Id. at 484–86. 
274. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.05, at 637–38 (4th 
ed. 2006). 
275. Spencer Sherman, When Cultures Collide, 6 CAL. LAW. 32, 60 (Jan. 1986). 
276. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
277. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION 
AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 259–60 (1998). 
278. Lawrence, supra note 234, at 112 (noting that “cultural racism” involves 
inferiorizing cultures, instead of race, i.e., making certain cultures appear inferior, deviant, 
and inherently unassimilable); see also RAZACK, supra note 192, at 60 (explaining how 
culturalized racism—attributing Black inferiority to cultural deficiency—allows society to 
deny responsibility for racism); Volpp, supra note 3, at 1601 (explaining that under cultural 
racism, “the culture of certain communities is posited as either inferior or incompatible with 
the values of the dominant community”). 
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will, and then the community endorses their marriage.279 The case reinforced 
negative stereotypes about Asian men in general and Hmong men in particular as 
foreigners with misogynistic patriarchal customs.280 The implicit assumption was 
that in America, this type of behavior would not be tolerated, when in fact we 
tolerate non-stranger rape—euphemistically called “date rape”—to a greater extent 
than is often acknowledged. Cultural convergence provides a better explanation 
than cultural sensitivity for the result in this and similar cases. 
D.  Black Men Who Successfully Argue “Black Rage” 
A final example of cultural convergence involves African-American 
defendants who successfully assert a “Black Rage” defense, a type of defense that 
Anthony Alfieri calls a deviance defense because it relies on a racialized narrative 
that reinforces assumptions about Blacks as deviant criminals.281 In Black Rage 
Confronts the Law, Paul Harris explains the difference between “black rage” and 
the “black rage defense”: 
 Black rage and the black rage defense are not synonymous. 
Black rage, in its positive and negative aspects, is examined 
insightfully by psychiatrists Price Cobbs and William Grier in their 
widely discussed 1968 book Black Rage. The frustration and anger 
of African Americans and their consequences for this country are 
also articulated in James Badwin’s The Fire Next Time. Black rage 
is eloquently expressed in the works of Alice Walker, Gloria 
Naylor, and Walter Mosley. It is found in the poems of Gwendolyn 
Bennett, in the music of KRS-One, in the essays of bell hooks, in 
the speeches of Malcolm X, in the “Ten-Point Program” of the 
Black Panther Party, and in the very history of African Americans. 
 The black rage defense is a legal strategy used in criminal 
cases. It is not a simplistic environmental defense. The 
overwhelming majority of African Americans who never commit 
crimes and who lead productive lives against overwhelming odds 
prove that poverty and racial oppression do not necessarily cause an 
individual to resort to theft, drugs, and violence. But is cannot be 
denied that there is a causal connection between environment and 
crime. A black rage defense explores that connection in the context 
of an individual defendant on trial.282 
                                                                                                                
279. See Volpp, supra note 3, at 1589–91 (“‘American’ is equated with progress: 
the world of work, the college campus, while ‘Hmong’ is associated with barbarity and 
tradition, in this case, rape.”). 
280. See Volpp, supra note 215, at 393 (critiquing the stereotypical view of Asian 
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While the Black Rage defense is not often asserted and rarely 
successful,283 it has on occasion worked to the benefit of individual black 
defendants. Consider the beating of truck driver Reginald Denny in South Central 
Los Angeles after acquittal verdicts were announced in the first (state) trial of the 
four officers charged with beating Rodney King. Denny, a Caucasian, was driving 
his truck in South Central Los Angeles when the verdicts were announced and 
pandemonium broke loose. The beating of Rodney King had been captured on 
home video and many expected that the four white police officers responsible for 
the beating would be convicted of assault. When the officers were instead 
acquitted by a mostly white Simi Valley jury, Blacks and Latinos in South Central 
Los Angeles reacted with anger and violence, setting fire to cars and businesses 
and looting stores.284 When Denny drove his truck into an intersection where a 
small angry crowd had gathered, he was pulled from his truck, kicked, and beaten 
almost to death.285 
Damian Monroe Williams and Henry Keith Watson, both African-
American, were charged with attempted murder, aggravated mayhem, torture, and 
second-degree robbery arising from their attack on Reginald Denny. Their 
attorneys did not deny that the beating took place, but argued that Williams and 
Watson lacked the specific intent to kill Denny because they were acting as a result 
of Black Rage and mob contagion.286 Apparently, the jury found this argument 
persuasive. Williams was acquitted of the charged offenses and convicted of 
simple mayhem and four misdemeanor assaults.287 Watson was acquitted of 
attempted murder and convicted of misdemeanor assault. The jury deadlocked on 
the other charges against Watson, leading to a mistrial on those counts.288 
How does cultural convergence help explain the verdicts in the Reginald 
Denny case?289 Because the criminal law does not recognize a “White Rage” 
defense or any other race-based deviance defense, it is difficult to see any 
convergence between minority and majority norms, let alone understand how such 
a convergence of norms could explain the verdicts. 
Although perhaps less obvious than in the cases involving Asian 
immigrant men charged with murdering their wives and Hmong men charged with 
rape, cultural convergence nonetheless may have played a role in the Reginald 
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Denny case. The defense of “Black Rage” rests on the argument that after years of 
racial discrimination and unequal treatment, a Black person who explodes in a fit 
of anger should not be held responsible for his conduct because the environment in 
which he lived contributed to his criminal acts.290 The defense of “mob contagion” 
suggests that the defendant got caught up in the actions of the group and acted out 
almost as if on auto-pilot. Both of these defenses, as used to explain and excuse the 
actions of the young African American men on trial for the beating of Reginald 
Denny, reinforced negative stereotypes about Blacks, in particular young Black 
males, as dangerous, violent, criminals. Extensive social science literature supports 
the association most people in the country make between Blackness and 
criminality.291 The “Black-as-Criminal” stereotype is so deeply ingrained in our 
subconscious that most of us must make a conscious effort to counter it or it will 
control our initial gut feelings. The verdicts in the Reginald Denny beating case, 
which essentially embraced the defense claims of “Black Rage” and “mob 
contagion,” reflected and reinforced the “Black-as-Criminal” image. Williams and 
Watson were partially excused for their actions because the jury believed these two 
young Black men could not help acting in the deviant way they did.292  
CONCLUSION 
The cases I have examined are troubling on a number of fronts. First, in 
each case, the defendant or defendants committed a crime of violence against an 
innocent victim. Dong Lu Chen bludgeoned his wife to death; Fumiko Kimura and 
Helen Wu killed their innocent children; Kong Moua had sexual intercourse with 
an unwilling partner; and Damian Williams and Henry Keith Watson kicked and 
beat Reginald Denny until he was almost dead.  
Second, the cultural narratives told by each of these defendants seem to 
have been persuasive to a large extent because they were either familiar refrains or 
tapped into existing sexist or racist social norms. Dong Lu Chen’s outrage at 
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discovering his wife’s infidelity may have made sense to Judge Pincus not only 
because American men have been similarly outraged, but because of stereotypes 
about patriarchal Chinese men and their familial relations. Fumiko Kimura’s story 
of despair and hopelessness was persuasive perhaps because it reinforced the 
image of the emotionally weak woman completely dependent on her husband for 
her happiness. Kong Moua’s claim that he honestly and reasonably believed Seng 
Xiong was consenting to sexual intercourse may have persuaded the prosecutor to 
drop the rape and kidnapping charges against him not only because of the he 
said/she said nature of his story, but also because doing so reinforced stereotypes 
about Asian men as barbaric misogynists. Damian Williams and Henry Keith 
Watson’s claim that they were caught up in the mob mentality of the moment and 
could not help beating Reginald Denny made sense to the jury because it 
reinforced deeply-ingrained stereotypes about young Black males as violent, 
deviant criminals. That these cultural narratives were successful when the vast 
majority of cultural narratives are rejected in courtrooms across the country 
suggests that the persuasiveness of a defendant’s cultural claims may turn on the 
extent to which the claims converge with dominant subtexts of racism and sexism.  
In cultural defense cases, it is important for attorneys to be aware of and 
to counter negative and possibly incorrect stereotypes. The prosecutor in the Dong 
Lu Chen case could have called an expert witness to counter Burton Pasternak’s 
testimony. Instead he did nothing on the assumption that the judge would not 
believe Pasternak’s assertions. The Assistant District Attorney who tried the Chen 
case explained, “[i]n our wildest imaginations, we couldn’t conjure up a scenario 
where the judge would believe that anthropological hocus-pocus.”293 The 
prosecutor in the Kong Moua case could have presented evidence that the Hmong 
practice of marriage by capture is no longer widely accepted by the Hmong 
community in America. The Hmong District of the Christian and Missionary 
Alliance, for example, has officially denounced marriage by capture.294 The 
prosecutor in Williams and Watson could have called expert witnesses to testify 
about the prevalence of the “Black-as-Criminal” stereotype and asked the judge to 
instruct the jurors that it is inappropriate to rely on racial stereotypes when 
deciding whether to acquit or convict.295 By not countering the cultural evidence 
presented, these prosecutors unwittingly assisted the other side. 
When minority and majority cultural norms converge, the minority 
offender may secure an acquittal or light treatment while reinforcing negative 
stereotypes about his entire community. By enabling us to understand these 
double-edged dynamics as well as the selective receptivity of the law towards 
certain cultural defenses, cultural convergence theory offers a starting point for 
scholars and policymakers concerned with the rule of law in an increasingly 
diverse society.  
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